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BRITISH LAND POLICY AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
A BELATED LECTURE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY
GEORGE O. VIRTUE
If this were spoken from a pulpit instead of from a teacher's
rostrum, I should be disposed to take as a text for what follows a
passage from C. W. Alvord's study of The Mississippi Valley in
British Politics. From the middle of the 18th century to the Revolution, how to deal with the great valley was, Alvord holds, the
number one American problem of every British ministry: How to
meet the claims of France to it and how to defend it once her
claims were extinguished; how to meet the claims to it of the seaboard colonies by virtue of their charters; how to protect the
Indian title to the soil and against the "frauds and abuses" of
traders and settlers; and finally, how best to make it of the greatest
advantage to the English economy. The conflicting claims of France
and England to the territory were discussed at the close of King
George's War, 1744-1748, but neither side was prepared for a showdown and they were left unsettled by the treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle.
A "cold war" ensued, each party seeking to strengthen its claim to
the valley by occupation in one form or another, especially at the
strategic Forks of the Ohio. The English got there "firstest," but
the French, counting guns, got there with the "mostest," and the
Virginians were driven back to the Atlantic side of the mountains.
The "cold war" lasted seven years. Then followed seven years of
bloody war, 1765-1763. We call it the French and Indian War, but
it became a worldwide war. In the end France lost heavily in the
Far East, in the West Indies, and on the North American continent.
She surrendered Canada with its eighty or ninety thousand French
population and her claims to the great region west of the Appalachians as far as the Mississippi River, except a small area at the mouth
of the river held by Spain. How these vast acquisitions were to be
managed was a problem full of difficulties. Very soon, however, it
was decided to mark off East Florida and West Florida for the establishment of separate colonies, and the same was done for Canada
though more than ten years passed before a colonial government
was set up there. The great interior region west of the mountains.
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inhabited, save for a few French settlers in the Illinois country,
only by scattered Indian tribes, was for the time being left an Imperial domain, without any commitment as to future colonial
status.
These decisions were announced in the Royal Proclamation on
North America, October 7, 1763. Recognizing the Indian title to
the soil, it declared all lands not hitherto purchased or ceded to
the King a reservation for the use of the Indians until so acquired.
It forbade the Colonial governors to "presume to make grants"
of such lands or to purchase them until the King's pleasure should
be known. All private persons were, likewise, forbidden to make
purchases of them or to occupy them except on special license first
obtained; and if any had "willfully or inadvertently" seated themselves on lands the title to which had not been acquired by the
Crown, they were enjoined "forthwith to remove themselves from
such settlements." The Indian trade, hitherto free, was also brought
under imperial regulation. All traders were required to secure
license from the colonial governor and give security to observe the
regulations prescribed in them.
By adopting a benevolent attitude toward the Indians, by
placing the traders under strict regulation, by impliedly fixing
western boundaries of the colonies at the mountains, by placing
a sharp restriction upon westward expansion, the Proclamation
reversed former British policy and ran counter to long-established
colonial practices. It ran counter, too, to the interest of numerous
speculators eager to secure grants ahead of the westward expansion
they foresaw must ere long be underway. Some of the provisions
were doubtless intended to be temporary, pending the adoption of
a permanent policy for the western country. They, in fact became
in a sense permanent through long delays due chiefly to personal
and factional strife within the government. The chief point of
contention was whether to permit the colonists to expand westward as they had always done, develop the land resources of the
region and so increase the Imperial revenues, or to confine them
to the seaboard where they would best serve the interest of the
British economy, and reserve the great interior region as huntinggrounds for the Indians and so preserve the source of supply for
the valuable fur trade. Well, it was the urge to westward expansion
that led the colonists to resist the French intrusion into the upper
Ohio country and to endure a long war for the right to occupy that
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region. And this brings us to our text: "Through the exigencies of
politics," says Alvord, "the British ministry had now established
the same limits of colonization [as the French had set]. In trying
to maintain these boundaries did Great Britain, like France, lose
an empire?" 1 This is our problem.
The great urge to settlement beyond the mountains that became
startlingly evident about the middle of the century did not come
primarily from homeseekers. It is true that most of the better lands
had been taken up for current or future use, but between the large
holdings there were considerable tracts available for family-sized
farms. The prime movers for westward expansion were men, already land-rich, who had learned from experience that the surest
way to acquire wealth in America was to secure land ahead of migration. Accumulating information brought back to the settlements
by traders and explorers gave rise to the vision of a great "inland
empire" in the west; they would be builders of that empire and
reap the emoluments due their services. The Indian danger and the
long stretches of wilderness between the old settlements and the
proposed new ones, made occupation by individual settlers impracticable; it must be "promoted" by men of means just as the
peopling of Virginia and indeed most of the colonies had been
promoted, largely through the "indented servant" system. How
to secure families to found the new settlement was one of the chief
concerns of the promoters. Soon plans took form beyond the
means of individual promoters, and companies were formed to
carry them through. From 1745 to 1754, 34 grants, ranging from
20,000 to 500,000 acres were made by Virginia alone in the region
included in what is now West Virginia and eastern Kentucky. This
was the beginning of the first great American speculative land boom.
Checked by the French and Indian War and Pontiac's War which
dovetailed with it, the movement was continued after the Peace of
1763 with greater vigor and on a grander scale. The number of
speculators increased and so, too, did their aspirations; in their
petitions for grants they sought not thousands, but millions, of
acres; the field of operation was extended to the Great Lakes, to
the Mississippi River; but it was in the upper Ohio country that
the competitive struggle was fiercest-a region that was to remain

1

Alvord, C. W. The MississiPPi Valley in British Politics, II. 91.
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a bone of contention between Indian tribes, Indians and Whites,
traders and settlers, between Virginians and the rest of the world,
including Pennsylvanians, Kentuckians and the Continental Congress.
Of the numerous speculative ventures in western lands in the
quarter century preceding the Revolution, three will, for the purpose in hand, require particular attention: that of the Ohio Company of Virginia, that of the Mississippi Company, and that of
the Grand Ohio Company seeking the so-called Walpole Grant.
THE OHIO COMPANY

While peace negotiations were going on toward the close of
King George's War, a group composed mainly of Virginia planters
formed a partnership under the name of the Ohio Company and
petitioned Lt. Governor Gooch for a large grant of land. This was
in 1747. The petition was denied on the ground that such a grant
might embarrass the negotiators; whereupon the Company sent
their petition to the King. 2 It was cordially received by the governmeI}t. The question of strengthening its shadowy claims to the
interior as against the shadowy claims of the French, had been considered as early as the 1720's when this method of forestalling the
French was proposed by Governor Spotswood. 3 But the time was
not ripe for such a venture. By 1748 it seemed to be; and here was
a body of well-to-do, capable men ready to establish and defend a
settlement at the most strategic point for forestalling the French,
for protecting the old settlements, and for resisting the pretentions

S For the memorial as sent to the King, see Kenneth P. Bailey, The Ohio
Company of Virginia, 298-301. It was presented by John Hanbury, a London
merchant and banker, onetime member of Parliament. The names of thirteen
other members appear in the petition. Chief among them is the name of
Thomas Lee, long a member of the King's Council in the colony and, at the
time of his death about to be appointed Lt. Governor; Thomas Nelson, also a
member of the Council; Lawrence Washington and his brother Augustus, and
George Fairfax, all Virginians. Two or three members lived in Maryland,
mentioned only as associates. Bailey finds that, first and last, through changes
in ownership, there were 25 shareholders, some 20 of whom served in the
House of Burgesses. Of the latecomers, mention should be made of George
Mason who later became spokesman for the company; George Washington,
never active in company affairs; and Robert Dinwiddie who succeeded Gooch
as Lt. Governor in 1751 and took an active-perhaps a too active-part in the
affairs of the company. The Ohio Company did not lack men of standing.
• Bailey, Kenneth P. The Ohio Company of Virginia, 22, 256.
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of the French, and all at their own expense. It, however, required
all of 1748 and well into the next year to arrange all details of the
concession, and it was not till July 1749 that the governor, following instructions from the King, made the grant. 4
The grant did not pass title to any land; that, in this case, had
to be earned. It provided that when the company had settled two
hundred families upon the land to be granted within seven years
and had built and garrisoned a fort for their protection, title would
be given to 200,000 acres of land; and that an additional 300,000
acres would be patented on like conditions-settling 100 families
for each 100,000 acres; all to be free of quit rents for ten years after
title was given. The grant was made on these conditions. What
were the motives of the government in making it?
Because of the outcome of the war which soon followed, it has
been generally believed that the grant was made in pursuance of a
plan of territorial expansion. If that was the government's purpose,
it was kept in the background. There seems to have been no inclination even now to bring the question of dominion to an issue.
There was, in fact, a more immediate interest to be promoted.
Professor McIlwain has persuasively argued,5 that it is a mistake to ascribe the long-standing rivalry between British and French
in the West "to a competition for territory, a hunger for land .. :'
Contemporary documents show, he says, that so. far as the English
government was concerned, "trade rather than land was the chief
ground of friction." The petitioners for the Ohio grant understood
the British interest in the fur trade and disclose their own interest
in it. It has been customary to regard the company as of a kind with
the numerous speculations of the period. It was, indeed, a land
company, but it was something more than that. It was also a colonizing and a trading company. The greater part of the petition is
taken up with the favorable oportunity offered by the friendly

• This like other "grants" of the period only gave authority to search for,
pick and choose the specified acreage within limits often necessarily vague because of lack of geographical knowledge. In the present case the area of selection was between certain creeks "on the south side of the River Aligane, otherwise the Ohio," and between certain creeks on the. north side of that stream
"or in such other parts to the west of said mountains as shall be adjudged most
proper by your Petitioners."
• In his Introduction to Peter Wraxall's Abridgement of the Indian Affairs,
(of New York) 1915. Charles H. McIlwain, ed.
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attitude of the western Indians, their inclination "to trade solely
with your Majesty's subjects," their desire that the inhabitants of
Virginia "send them British goods and manufactures," a service
Virginia was favorably situated for performing because of its easy
access to the interior by way of the Potomac and the Monongahela
and so to Lake Erie. The proposed settlement and fort would
strengthen the frontier and be "the means of gaining a vast addition and increase to your Majesties subjects of that rich Branch
of the Peltry and Furr Trade . . . and at the same time greatly
promote the Consumption of Our own British Manufactures, enlarge Our Commerce, increase our shipping and Navigation and
extend your Majesty's Empire in America and, in a short space of
time, very considerably increase Your Majesty's Revenue of Quit
Rents." For, it was argued, the company's settlement once established, great numbers of "Foreign Protestants would wish to settle
in this fertile region." It was for promoting these national ends
that the grant was justified.
The role of the fur trade in the colonial economy, as McIlwain
says, has not been adequately realized. It was from the beginning,
an important factor in the welfare of every colony, both for use
and for export. As the agricultural frontier moved westward and
the fur bearing animals were all but exterminated, so, too, was the
Indian trade. By the middle of the 18th century the bulk of that
trade was with the tribes west of the mountains, most of it
channelled through New York to Albany. This was made possible
by the long, firm friendship which from the Dutch period on had
existed between the colony and the Iroquois (the Six Nations). This
strong confederation, asserting a sort of overlordship over the
western tribes, did not permit a direct trade between them and
Albany. They themselves received the western furs and disposed
of thel!1 to the English. But not all the tribes carried their peltry
to the Iroquois. Some were in alliance-had trade relations-with
the French whose traders had long ranged widely over the westbut mainly, it appears, in territory tributory to the Lakes and to the
Mississippi. Although English traders had, since the Treaty of
Utrecht, 1713, had equal rights with the French to trade "without
molestation" in the western country, they were slow in exercising it.
During the second quarter of the century they began to penetrate
behind the mountains and by the end of that period it was estimated
there were 300 of them, most of them Pennsylvanians, in the Ohio
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country and northward to the Lakes region. Rivalry increased
with numbers. DeNoyan, in charge of the important trading post
at Detroit, wrote, "The English have been coming for a Number
of years to Corrupt the Savages within the Sphere of this Post. I
have resolved to have them pillaged. I will Begin by Sending them
a Summons." 6 One way of "corrupting" the Indians was to offer
higher prices for their furs than the French could give; (this for
several reasons, among them the offer of British rum as against
French brandy). There was ground for French alarm; for the fur
trade was a more important element in the Canadian economy than
in that of the English colonists, and the French government, as
well as the English, regarded it as a great national interest. The
French, as Hulbert points out, had felt secure in the exploitation
of the upper Ohio country because of its mountain barrier; but
the English traders, especially the Pennsylvanians, had demonstrated
that the mountains, though an obstacle, were not, for the French,
a secure defense against the intrusion of English traders. Hitherto
the southern colonies had had to be content with the less valuable
peltry found in the more accessible hunting-grounds of their backcountry. The Ohio Company of Virginia now proposed to establish
itself in the rich fur-bearing region of the upper Ohio.
The company lost no time in launching this branch of their
enterprise. In February, 1748, a few days after its petition was
presented in London, and more than a year before it was finally
acted upon, the partners voted an assessment on themselves for the
purchase of "Indian goods" and sent an order to John Hanbury,
their London member, to be filled by installments as it was judged
the goods would be needed. It was stipulated that the amount
should not exceed 4,000 pounds sterling. They apparently expected
their banker member to carry the account in part, for the assessment made was only 100 pounds sterling per member.7 Whether
this prompt action was taken on the assumption that their grant
of land was certain to be allowed, or because of a determination in
any case to engage in trade, is not certain. The next year they
bought land and built a store-house on the Maryland side of the
upper Potomac, where Cumberland now stands. In the fall soon
after their grant was made they "employed Gentlemen to discover
• Quoted by McIlwain (XVI) from Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVII, 358,
• Bailey, The Ohio Company of Virginia, 69.
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lands beyond the mountains." At the end of a year they had "made
no considerable progress" and toward the end of 1750 Christopher
Gist was selected to make the search for suitable lands and to cultivate friendship with the Indians. Two years were consumed in
this task. He explored the region north of the Ohio as far west as
the Great Miami and south of the Ohio as far as the Great Kanawha.
It was in this latter quarter that he found the best lands for settlement, protected against danger from the north and free, as it was
thought, from conflicting claims. The company petitioned the
Governor and Council for leave to survey and take· up its grant
in the Kanawha region. This being denied, it was then decided to
petition the King for an enlargement of the grant of 1749, and to
have it all located within clearly defined boundaries, the company
agreeing to settle an additional 100 families and to build two
additional forts, one of them at the forks of the Kanawha and the
Ohio.s It was not till April 2, 1754, that this petition reached the
Board of Trade. In the meanwhile a crisis had been reached in the
affairs of the Ohio Company, and of the Empire.
The history of the company is a catalog of misfortunes. First of
all Thomas Lee, the moving spirit of the enterprise, died in
February 1751, and little more than year later Lawrence Washington after a long illness also died. To this loss of leadership is
probably due the long delay in beginning operations. As already
pointed out, the company from the first encountered hostility within the colony. The reason given by Lt. Governor Gooch for denying
the company's petition was not his only one. He trained with a
political faction opposed for reasons of its own, to the group, closely
related by blood and marriage, which formed the Ohio Company.
When the King reminded the governor that he had authority under
his instructions to make grants and directed him to proceed with
that on the Ohio, he used it to make a series of grants in the same
general region. Among them was one of 800,000 acres made on
the very day the Ohio Company's grant was announced, to a group
known as the Loyal Company. Another notable grant was that
made by Governor Dinwiddie's proclamation, to soldiers enlisting
for military service on the frontier in 1754. These grants added to
• The Ohio Company,70; and the Company's Petition of 1754 for an Enlargement of their grant, 306-307. Bailey says young George Washington was sent
out to "survey" lands for the company. I have found no confirmation of this.
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those previously made, created a situation which made it impossible
as Washington later declared, for anyone to be certain of securing
a title to the land he selected.
Conditions on the upper Ohio were further complicated by conflicting territorial claims. Pennsylvania's western boundary was set
at five degrees west of the Delaware River, but the line had never
been run. The major activities of the company, including the construction of a fort, were carried on in disputed territory which later
was found to be well within the Penn grant. This territorial conflict
sharpened the resentment of the Pennsylvania traders against the
"interlopers" from the south and brought about relations little
"short of war." They industriously spread the information among
the Indians that the Ohio Company intended to take their land,
to make a settlement, to build a strong-house, creating a distrust
of the company never overcome. French traders pursued the same
tactics. When the Ohio Company was formed, interference from
Canada with its project seemed remote; as Thomas Lee wrote the
Board of Trade, there was then no French danger. By 1750 that
danger had to be reckoned with. The year before Celeron had appeared on the Ohio with his leaden plates, taking formal possession
of the territory in the name of his King, and warning the Indians
not to trade with the English. This was the first step in what proved
to be a plan for establishing the French claims to the Ohio country.
Whether it was taken as a counter-move to the Ohio Company
project is not clear. As the months went by English traders were
warned against trespassing on French territory, several of them
were seized and carried off to Canada, the Indians who trafficked
with the English were threatened and in 1752 the important Miami
village of Pickawillamy was destroyed. By the early summer of
1753 the situation had become alarming to the Virginians. Word
had been received that the French were building a line of forts
from Lake Erie to the Allegheny. The intent seemed obvious-to
establish themselves at the junction of that river with the Monongahela, a point recognized by all as of great strategic importance.
The Ohio Company was galvanized into action. The year before a conference of the Ohio Tribes had been assembled at Logstown on the Ohio a few miles below the Forks, ostensibly to receive
presents the company had promised them as a seal of friendship.
But there was other business on the agenda of the company. The
Virginians wanted leave to build a fort on the Ohio. Historically
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Indian policy had steadily opposed white men's forts in their territory, but in face of the present danger from the north, consent was
readily given. The company wanted their right recognized to make
settlements west of the mountains. Did the right given to build a
fort imply the right to make setlements and to own the land on
which they were made? This question was put to the Half-King of
the Senecas, the chief spokesman for the Indians; his answer was,
no. The River tribes had repudiated the pretended sale to the
English, of lands west of the mountains by the Six Nations at Lancaster in 1744. He did not understand that Virginia had any lands
there; and "it was only in the power of the Onondago Council to
dispose of Ohio territory; but later that day," says Bailey cryptically,
he "agreed to English settlements east of that river." 9 With the
fort and the settlements agreed to, a treaty was drawn up and
duly signed. At a conference held at Winchester the next year
(September, 1753) for the purpose of forming an alliance with all
the tribes of the region to resist the French, and to secure confirmation of the Logstown Treaty, all efforts to induce the Indians to
surrender title to their lands were in vain. A spokesman for the
Indians summed up their attitude on these questions. There had
been much talk, he said, of driving the French out of the Ohio
country: "And brother, when we do that, we will consider what
to say about the lands; and as to the strong-house that is to be
built." (Bailey, p. 141).
In August, 1753, William Trent, an experienced trader from
Pennsylvania, now employed by the Ohio Company on the Monongahela, sent Dinwiddie further details of the French advance and
added that the Half-King of the Senecas "had been appointed to
warn the French off Indian lands." A French officer told him,
as later reported by Washington, that the Indians had no lands,
they all belonged to his master the King; "you do not own as much
land as the black of your finger nail."
Already the company had been roused by the activities of the
French to take belated action with respect to the fort. At a meeting
in July plans and specifications were drawn up for one to be built
(at the Forks, as it turned out) and for a town to be laid out adjoining if the lay of the land permitted. George Mason was author• The Ohio Company of Virginia, 135·137.
Monongahela, sometimes called the Ohio.

This seems to refer to the
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ized to send an order to their merchant-member, Hanbury in London for twenty swivel guns and ammunition for the fort. A little
later an assessment was made on the members for the purchase of
supplies and for the employment of men to build the fort. But it
was not till late in December, 1753, that the expedition was started
on its way to the Forks.
The news which had roused the Ohio Company to action
created a sense of alarm throughout the colonies and in England.
The governor of Pennsylvania wrote DinwiddIe to learn what had
been done about building the fort that had been decided upon four
years before and that had been used by the Pennsylvania traders
to create Indian distrust of the Virginians. He offered the assistance
of his colony to carry it forward; an assistance which, although
backed by the proprietors, he was never able to give. DinwiddIe had
already written the home government describing the danger which
threatened the colony, and suggesting "the utility of building some
forts upon the Ohio in the western part of Virginia." It was autumn
before a reply was received in the form of a letter of instructions
for meeting the French danger. The suggestion to build forts on
the Ohio "at the charge of the colony" was approved, and "thirty
cannon of four-pounders" with appropriate stores, were ordered
to be consigned to the governor. He was directed to call out and
arm the militia; and in case obstructions were encountered in
building the forts, "to meet force by force." The instructions went
farther. If any Europeans, not British subjects, should be found
to have built forts or should presume to do so, within the limits
of Virginia or other English colony, the governor was authorized,
after due warning "to take appropriate action." No indication was
given as to "the limits of Virginia or other colony" the government
was ready thus to defend. First of all, however, the governor was
instructed to obtain accurate information as to the extent and
character of the French fortifications, and the military strength of
their support.
It was in pursuance of this last instruction that George Washington, October 21, 1753, was sent on his mission to carry Dinwiddie's warning to the French on the upper Allegheny against
intrusion on British territory and to request the intruders peaceably
to depart. The reply was what might have been expected. This
and the report Washington brougIit back in mid-January, 1754,
that the French planned to move to the Ohio in the Spring, led
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to energetic action on the part of Governor Dinwiddie. He called
the House of Burgesses to convene at the earliest possible datea month hence; he directed two county lieutenants in charge of the
militia to enlist volunteers for service and assemble them at
Alexandria; he sent a Captain's commission to William Trent, an
experienced Indian trader in the employ of the Ohio Company,
and directed him to raise a company of 100 men and take them to
the Forks to join others to be sent for the protection of the fort;
he appointed John Carlyle, another member of the company, as
commissary of supplies and stores; in order to stimulate enlistment
he issued a proclamation 10 which promised 200,000 acres of land
on the Ohio for those who served in the companies to be raised,
and, in accordance with his instructions, he called upon the governors of other colonies to furnish aid in meeting a common danger.
The Burgesses who met at Williamsburg in the middle of
February were in no mood to co-operate with the governor. He
had sent them home only a few weeks before in the midst of a
bitter quarrel over the imposition of an additional fee-the famous
"pistole fee," to be charged against grants of land. But back of
this there were fundamental questions to be answered: did the
region occupied belong to the French or was that designed to be
occupied part of Virginia; was it English territory; would war-like
preparations lead to actual war; was the governor asking for funds
to safeguard the interests of the Empire, of the colony, or of a
private company? As a member of the company the governor was
in an embarrassing position. But he might well have said he was
acting in the interest of all. The King had chosen to subsidize the
company as a spearhead-as a means of establishing English rights,
whether of trade or territory, in a sort of no-man's land and he,
Dinwiddie, had been instructed by the King to assert and protect
those rights by force if necessary.
In the end a small appropriation was made and the governor's
plan went forward. He appointed a colonel of the regiment to be
raised. He appointed George Washington to command the little
troop of volunteers assembled at Alexandria, and later ordered him
to proceed to the Forks to protect the workmen on the fort. Washington began his march on April 2, 1754, the very day the Ohio
Company's petition for an enlarged grant on the Kanawha was
10

The Ohio Company Papers, Kenneth P. Bailey ed. 25·26.
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laid before the Board of Trade. The correspondence l l between
the young officer and the governor is the best source of information
about the expedition. It unfolds a story of incredible hardships, and
final failure. When Washington reached the Ohio Company's store
house on the upper Potomac (Wills Creek) he learned that the
French had driven the workmen away from the unfinished fort.
He decided to move forward in the hope of retrieving it, opening as
he went a road for supply wagons that did not come. When he
reached the Great Meadows he did receive a reinforcement-an "Independent Company" of North Carolinians commanded by one
Captain McKaye who had a royal commission. It proved to be an
embarrassment, not an aid; neither the captain nor his men would
obey the orders of a colonial officer of whatever rank-would not
even salute him. The young provincial got his first lesson on his
position in the British scheme of things. While at this place, he
learned from Indian scouts of a detachment of French in a concealed position not far away. By a night march he came upon the
party, fired upon it, killing a score, including the officer in command.
The rest, some 20 men and officers surrendered and were sent back
to Winchester. After a few days spent in clearing the meadow of
bushes, he began his "march to Redstone Creek" on the Monongahela. He met hunters, traders and friendly Indians fleeing before
a large force of French and Indians-it proved to be 700 strongwas deserted by his Indian "allies," was himself compelled to fall
back to his improvised fort at Great Meadows, closely followed by
the enemy. Here after an all-day fight he capitulated, and was
allowed the next morning, July 4, 1754, to march off to the settlements, leaving the French in control of the Ohio country and the
great valley. Braddock's expedition the next year likewise failed
to retake the fort at the Forks. For the time being the English
were confined to the Atlantic side of the mountains. 12
The events just narrated came at the end of the seven-year
period in which the Ohio Company was to earn its grant. It had
failed to do so; legally it was dead, as has often been said. But if
it was dead its ghost walked in London for ten eventful years and
Writings of George Washington, Fitzpatrick, ed. Vol. I.
In 1758 the Forbes expedition fitted out in Pennsylvania and moving over
the Traders route crossed the mountains and reached the fort only to find it
empty. The French had moved northward.
11
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at Williamsburg much longer, seeking for an equitable settlement
of the company's claims, a settlement it never got; and therein lies
the reason for this extended account of the fortunes of the enterprise.
We shall hear more of the company as we proceed. But here
some account of its ill-directed efforts to secure restorative measures
may be added. Even before the close of the war, in 1760, counsel
was employed in London to protect the Company's interests, but
without result. In 1763, George Mercer, a member of the company.
was sent over for the same purpose. The choice was not a fortunate
one. Thomas P. Abernathy, in his Western Land and the American
Revolution, tells us that he distinguished himself by eloping with
a nobleman's daughter and by serving a term in a debtor's jail.
In 1765 he secured an appointment as stamp collecter for Virginia.
The reception he received there was such that within a fortnight he
was on his way back to London. From time to time he petitioned
the government for a reaffirmation of the grant and remuneration
for the damage done the Company's property by Braddock's army.
In 1770 without authority from the American members, he merged
the company with a larger enterprise on the Ohio. Two years
later the agreement was repudiated by the company. George
Mason was now spokesman for the home members. In 1773, following the example of others who had claims to lands in the West,
and like them ignoring British authority, he engaged surveyers to
layoff, in the Kentucky country, the 200,000 acres believed to be
justly due the Ohio Company. They, in fact, surveyed tracts containing some 800,000 acres. It is not clear what his next step was
to be. It was a time when the governor, Lord Dunmore, and the
council were, quite contrary to law, authorizing surveys, and passing
titles to claimants in closed territory, and it seems probable that
Mason hoped to gain title from the same source. But his surveys
lagged and by the time they were ready, the war was on and Dunmore was in retreat. In 1777 the twenty-five years of life of the company, as fixed in 1752, came to an end. The next year Mason made
a last appeal to the Virginia assembly on behalf of the company.
Six of the members were living in England. mostly in arrears. For
these he made no special plea. For the American members he asked
for an act of the assembly authorizing the issue of a patent to each
for his proportionate share of 200,000 acres of land, upon payment
of the customary "Right-Money" (10 shillings per 100 acres) in lieu
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of the obligation in the original grant to build and garrison a fort.
No action was ever taken on the petition. In 1792 Mason died
leaving to his son his share of stock and his share of the company's
assets when determined. These consisted of the land bought at
Wills Creek in 1748, and a few tracts Mason had bought with borrowed money and held in trust for the company. When these debts
were paid the assets were found to be 102 pound, 12 shillings,
9 pence. 13
As has already been pointed out, when the war ended and the
Pontiac uprising was suppressed, with England in undisputed control of the great valley, the invasion of the West took on new
dimensions. Individual families now found it feasible to cross the
mountains in search of new homes. Speculative enterprises took
on new dimensions. The size of grants. sought, as before stated,
rose from thousands, to millions of acres. Two of these claim our
special attention: that of the Mississippi Company, and that of the
Philadelphia trading company of Boynton, Wharton, and Morgan
which played a part in several undertakings and finally in the formation of the Grand Ohio Company, beneficiary of the "Walpole
grant," and promoter of the colony of Vandalia.
THE MISSISSIPPI COMPANY

A month before the Proclamation on North America was issued, a group of Virginians with a few residents of Maryland formed
a partnership for the purpose of acquiring western land, and
adopted a memorial to the King praying for a grant of 2,500,000
acres on the westernmost boundary of the newly acquired territory.
It was to be selected from an area to be bounded as follows: starting
at the. mouth of the Ohio, up the Mississippi 120 miles, thence east
to the Wabash, down that stream to its mouth and continuing
southward to the Tennessee River, westward to the Mississippi and
up that river to the place of beginning. The petitioners represented
themselves as fifty in number, as being "of good families with considerable influence in the counties where they live," and as "possessed of moderate fortune." A scanning of the list of the eighteen
members present at the meeting of September 9, 1763, confirms this
18 For the later history of the company see Bailey's The Ohio Company of Virginia, 269-281. Various petitions of the compay are printed in the appendix;

that of 1778 on pages !l20-!l27.
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general character of the group not yet brought to its full membership. There were two Washingtons, four Lees, and two Fitzhughes.
They were not without experience in such enterprises; one-third
of those present were, or had been, members of the Ohio Company.
The petitioners, it is evident, were familiar with the principles of
British commercial policy. They pointed out that a population
would be attracted to the region by its richness and by easy terms
of acquiring land, which would soon be producing commodities
most wanted by Great Britain, "now purchased of foreigners at
very great expense, such as Hemp, Flax, Indigo, Iron ... and Naval
Stores;" and further that the inhabitants, devoted from interest
to agriculture "will not think of interfering with the Mother Country in Manufactures but afford a .never failing demand for them."
The petitioners said little about the French and the Indian danger;
they assumed, however, that the British government would take
steps to provide military protection against those dangers and suggested two points within their area suitable for forts. Nothing
is said in the petition about how the people of the expected settlement were to be governed, whether by Virginia laws,14 as a separate
colony, or under a military establishment. It is clear there was no
expectation of setting up a new proprietary colony. The articles
of agreement provided that the grant if secured should be divided
into fifty equal parts, 50,000 acres for each share, and assigned by
lot. Mr. Thomas Cumming of London was chosen to present the
petition and to "procure subscribers to the scheme not exceeding
nine of such influence and fortune as may be likely to promote its
success." No such persons seem ever to have been found and little
if any official consideration was given to the memorial. There was
reason for this. The Pontiac War was in full swing, and, at the
very moment the company was framing its petition, the ministry was
hastening the Proclamation on North America in the hope of quieting the general unrest by removing its causes. It placed the Indians,
as we have seen, under Imperial supervision;15 it recognized the
Indian ownership of the land and provided that it could be ceded
.. Carter points out, in another connection, that, in 1738, when Virginia
created the frontier county of Augusta, its eastern boundary was fixed at the
Blue Ridge Mountains and its western boundary at "the utmost limits of
Virginia." The Illinois Country, 103 .
.. The plan of supervision was elaborated the next year, 1764. It provided
for two superintendents of Indian affairs, one for the region north of the
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or sold only to the King at a public meeting; and it forbade all
British subjects to occupy lands thus reserved for Indian hunting
grounds, and ordered any who had occupied such lands to depart
from them forthwith. The planting of settlements deep in the
Indian country was no part of British policy in 1763. For five years
the affairs of the Mississippi Company remained quiescent. Toward
the end of 1768 it came to life again. Dr. Arthur Lee appeared in
London with a new petition for a grant of 2Y2 million acres to be
selected within an area lying between the 38th and 42nd parallels
of latitude and extending from the Alleghenies "westward to the
dividing line." The reason for this shift of interest from the lower
Ohio country to the upper Ohio will be clearer after dealing with
certain aspects of British policy toward the west which appear in
this'important year of 1768. It may be said at once, however, that
the company's second petition fared scarcely better than the first.
It was read in the Council December 16, 1768, was referred to the
Board of Trade in the March following and there "considered" in
May, 1770. This seems to close the official history of the company.
Meanwhile another group of speculators had entered the lists for
grants both on the Mississippi and in the upper Ohio Country,
and to these we now turn.
THE

VAN~ALIA ENTERPRISE

Before taking up the new competition on the Ohio, it will be
well to mention another early attempt, this time by Pennsylvanians,
to secure a grant of land on the Mississippi. The episode is worth
recounting because it led to an important decision by the ministry
concerning the ever-present western question and because it serves
also to introduce us to a small but energetic group of men connected with the subject of this section, the great Walpole Grant and
the plan to create a new proprietory colony on territory claimed
by Virginia.
In the spring of 1766 a partnership was formed at Philadelphia
for the purpose of acquiring land in the "Illinois Country." The
original purpose was to purchase the land of the French settlers in
Ohio, the other for the region south of that river, and defined their powen.
Sir William Johnson of New York colony was appointed as superintendent of
the northern district. He played a conspicuous part in western affairs till his
death in 1774.
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that region who, it was supposed, would leave in considerable numbers when French authority should be formally turned over to the
English. The idea originated with George Croghan, deputy of Sir
William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian affairs for the northern
district. As early as 1764, when in London on semi-official business,
he ~ad suggested to the Board of Trade that if these lands could
be acquired by English subjects, they might become the basis of
"a respectable colony." He later discussed the purchase as a
personal venture with Johnson and had received his approval,16
Now, in March 1766, while in Philadelphia arranging for a shipment of goods to "the Illinois" for reconciling the Indians to the
change of sovereignty, he discussed his plans with the trading firm
of Boynton, Wharton, and Morgan with which he had an exclusive
contract for supplying the Indian goods required in his district for
"presents." The firm had long been engaged in the Indian trade
on the upper Ohio and was now preparing to extend their operations to the rich fur-bearing country of the Illinois. It may have
been for prudential reasons that Croghan was willing to share his
enterprise with the trading company,l1 At any rate it was decided
to form a company and a few friends were invited to join in the
speculation, among them Sir William Franklin, at the time governor
of New Jersey. The prospect seemed promising that a colony
and a civil government must soon be established in that quarter
and this led Governor Franklin to propose that a grant of land
be applied for. This being approved, articles of agreement were
drawn forming the "Illinois Company." It was agreed, in addition
to the purchase of French lands, to petition the King for a grant
of "Twelve Hundred Thousand acres of land, and more thereof
if to be procured," and provision was made for raising the necessary
funds for the division of the land when acquired, and for admitting
a limited number of additional partners. The agreement was
signed by the members of the trading firm, including three Whartons, and by Governor Franklin, Joseph Galloway, long a wellknown political figure in the province, John Hughes, and George

Alvord and Carter, The New Regime, Johnson's letter p. 4.
Croghan wrote Johnson in November, 1765, about certain reports "scandalous, injurious to me," adding ... "I have always avoided the imputation of a
Moneymaker since my appointment in the Indian department." The New
Regime, 55.
18
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Croghan who signed also for Sir William Johnson. The agreement
was sent to the Superintendent for his approval, which it received.
It was not till July that Johnson received from the company its
petition for a land grant, to be forwarded by him to the Colonial
Secretary through Benjamin Franklin who had been made a partner
and was to act as London agent for the company. The memorial
was written by Sir William Franklin, but neither his name nor
johnson's was to appear in the matter. It was accompanied by a
long series of notes headed: "Reasons for establishing a British
Colony at the Illinois with some Proposals for carrying the same into
immediate Execution." 18 The reasons given were not unlike those
put forward three years before by the Mississippi Company and
those being currently pressed by General Phineas Lyman and the
military adventurers, and they need not be recounted here. The
boundaries proposed included the present state of Illinois, extended
northward to the 'Visconsin River which was to be followed to its
source, thence eastward by portage and the Fox River to Lake
Michigan, the western and southern shore of which was to be follOwed; thence eastward to Lake Erie and along its southern shore
to the mouth of the Maumee River. The final link in the boundaries
was this stream and the portage from it to the Wabash. It was suggested that it would be necessary for the Crown to purchase all
Indian rights to the land between the Illinois and the Ohio rivers
and fifty miles eastward from the Mississippi; "This would be a
sufficient Tract·to begin a Colony upon." A civil government should
be provided and placed under a governor "experienced in the management of Indian Affairs, and who has given proofs of his influence
with the Savages.' The proposals for speedy settlement of the colony
were: (1) To grant land in specified amounts to men and officers
who had served in the King's forces on the condition; that they
settle upon it; and (2) A grant to the Illinois Company (not named,
but described as "a Company of Gentlemen of Character and
Fortune"), say the twelve hundred thousand acres of land petitioned
for, on condition that 2,000 persons be settled on it within a specified time after the grant or the arrival of a governor for the colony.
When in September Franklin received the company's papers,
he acted with alacrity.19 He found that Lord Shelburne, who had
,. Alvord and Carter, The New Regime, 1765-1767, pp. 247-257.
,. A pretty fair record of his activity in the matter is found in his letters
to his son. Works (Smyth ed.) Vols. 4 and 5.
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recently become a Secretary of State for the Colonies, was favorable
to western expansion but unconvinced as to the desirability of a
colony on the Mississippi, and long remained so. The chief interest
of the ministry in the colonies, now that the Stamp Act had been
repealed, was how to increase the revenue from them and reduce
expenses. Shelburne was looked to for plans to attain these ends.
He was opposed to any new taxation which, by the beginning of
1767, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was hinting at.
He had opposed the Stamp Act, had voted for its repeal and
against the Declaratory Act, not because he doubted the doctrine
of parliamentary supremacy but because he thought it impolitic,
in view of the existing state of mind in America. Where, then,
was he to find the additional revenue expected from the colonies?
For a century and a half the Crown had been granting land to all
and sundry for a pittance, reserving a small annual payment in
perpetuity, called, from its feudal origin, a quit-rent. It was well
known that the collection of these rents had been notoriously irregular, the revenue disappointingly small; and now here was a
great new region in the west about to be opened as he thought, to
occupation. It was to the government's great land interests that
Shelburne looked for additional American revenue. In December,
1766, he called upon colonial officials for detailed information
regarding every aspect of land grants and quit rents, and for suggestions to improve their administration. He must have found
the replies as they came in disappointing. In the proprietary
colonies, the quit-rents went to the proprietors; in New England,
only the memory of the Andros attempt to impose such a charge remained; all efforts to reform the system had met with little success;
and in any case improved administration in the old colonies or the
opening of the west would require time and could provide only a
future revenue.
Equally baffling was the outlook for a reduction of expenses.
The heavy cost of provisioning the military posts recently taken
over from the French was in itself formidable; the Indian service
directed by the Superintendents had proved to be expensive beyond
all expectations, especially the item of "presents" necessary to keep
the Indians pacified; the requirement that all trade should be carl"ied on at the military posts required the maintenance there of
"Commissaries of Indian affairs" charged with the supervision of
all trade, the settling of trade disputes, and promoting harmonious
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relations between whites and natives. Each post also had an
interpreter and a blacksmith for the convenience of the natives
without charge. The expense of imperial control of the west in
the interest of the King's new wards was indeed burdensome.
Shelburne was not without advice concerning a course to pursue.
There was Lord Barrington at the War Office, for example, who,
with half-knowledge of the western question, recommended the
withdrawal of the western garrisons, the confinement of the traders
within the Proclamation line, in order to prevent them, "by cheating
and misusing the natives, from bringing on national quarrels,"
thus leaving it to the Indians to come to the back settlements with
their peltry for exchange. All this was based on the theory that:
"the Country on the westward of our Frontier quite to the
Mississippi was intended to be a desert for the Indians to hunt in
and inhabit." 20 Shelburne, who held no such view of the future
of the West, was not influenced by this naive proposal to curtail
colonial expenses. But when in the spring of 1767, the Chancellor
of the Exchequer called upon him for his estimates-it was virtually
a demand for a reduction of expenses,-he was unable to comply
because his plans for the West were not matured. This led to something like a "battle royal" according to Professor R. A. Humphreys,21
who attributes his failure to decide upon a plan of action to
Shelburne's personal qualities which seemed to unfit him for the
position he occupied, among them a sort of "academic hesitancy."
The hero of the "battle" was the Chancellor, Charles Townshend,
whose personal traits were in striking contrast to those of the Secretary. Lecky describes him as a man of "extraordinary comprehension . . . exuberance of animal spirits, a brilliant and ever ready
wit, a man of clear, rapid, and spontaneous eloquence," but lacking
in earnestness of character and loyalty to his colleagues. During
the long illness of the prime minister, he had acquired an ascendency in the cabinet which no one was courageous enough to challenge. At the beginning of the year he had let it be known that he
had found a way of raising a colonial revenue free from the objections urged against the Stamp Act; and now in May, 1767, he
.0 The New Regime, pp. 234-243.
""Lord Shelburne and British Colonial Policy," English Historical Review,
50, pp. 257-277. Ibid, Vol. 49, pp. 241-63 for Shelburne's relation to the Proclamation of 1763.
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introduced two bills designed for that purpose. One of them provided for the creation of a Board of Commissioners of Customs
charged with the enforcement of the Navigation Acts; the other,
brought in without authorization by the cabinet, imposed duties
on a few colonial imports, among them a three-penny tax on tea.
He was the readier to father these bills, it may be said, because
the landed interest in Parliament had just succeeded, against his
protest, in reducing the English land tax by twenty-five per cent.
There were indeed strong arguments for these laws, but as Leay
points out, there was a stronger one against them, namely that, as
events proved, it was not possible to enforce them. That Townshend
thought it was, says Lecky, "is a strange instance of the fallibility
of political foresight."
It was in the midst of this turmoil over colonial aflairs that
Shelburne was cautiously working out a plan for the West that
would be just, safeguard both Empire and colonial interests, and
would meet the approval of a divided cabinet. Franklin had neglected no opportunity to press judiciously the importance of planting a
colony in the Illinois, and at length he was able to report progress.
On a day in August he dined with Shelburne, General Conway
(formerly Colonial Secretary) being also a guest. He found them
considering possible ways of reducing the expenses of adimnistration in the West, one of them the dismissal of the Superintendents
and the return of control of Indian trade to the provinces. It seems
like a ready-made occasion for Franklin.
"I took the opportunity," he wrote his son, August 28, 1767, "of
urging it as one means of saving expense in supporting the outposts, that a settlement should be made in the Illinois country,
expatiated on the various advantages, namely, furnishing provisions cheaper to the garrisons, securing the country, retaining
the trade, raising a strength there, which on occasion of a future
war, might easily be poured down the Mississippi upon the
lower country, and into the Bay of Mexico, to be used against
Cuba, the French Islands, or Mexico itself. I mentioned your
plan, its being approved by Sir William Johnson, and the
readiness and ability of the gentlemen concerned to carry the
settlement into execution, with very little expense to government. The secretaries appeared finally to be fully convinced,
and there remained no obstacle but the Board of Trade, which
was to be brought over privately before the matter should be
referred to them officially. In case of laying aside the superin-
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tendents, a provision was thought of for Sir William Johnson.
He will be made governor of the New Colony." (Works, Vol. 5,
pp.45-6.)
It is not known just when Shelburne reached a decision as to
planting settlements on the western border, but there is reason for
suspecting that it was before this conversation and that Franklin
was kept unaware of it. Within a fortnight he presented his long
waited-for report to the Cabinet on a "System for the Trade and
Management of the Indians." 22 The expenses, he said, were so
great as to require reduction or adequate means of defraying them.
The Stamp Act, designed for this purpose, was "too unpopular and
unconstitutional to prove effectual;" the adequacy of the recent
"Regulations and Duties" (was he thinking of those imposed by
Townshend, who had died just a week before?) was doubtful. The
plan of reduction he proposed is sufficiently shown by the questions
he was authorized to submit to the Board of Trade and by the report
of that body: Could the expenses of the Indian trade be safely reduced by turning the management back to the several provinces;
by dispensing with the superintendents or at least curtailing their
functions; by reducing the number of forts under imperial control
or by turning them, also, over to the colonies; and finally whether
by "establishing a government at Detroit and another at the Illinois
the greater part of the expenses will not be rendered unnecessary"?
It will be noticed that at this time Shelburne had in mind the erection of two colonies in the western country. While the matter was
pending his attention was called to the military importance of occupying the region which the Mississippi Company had petitioned
for in 1763, at the mouth of the Ohio, and the Secretary requested
the Board to consider the advisability of planting a third colony in
that region.
The Board made its report March 7, 1768. The primary concern here is its recommendation concerning the proposed new
colonies; but it is well to note that the Board recognized that Imperial control of the great valley had not worked well and was very
expensive, and it approved Lord Shelburne's suggestion for turn"Ill. Hist. Doc., XVI, pp. 12-21. For some reasons the questions and accompanying documents were not sent to the Board till October 5. The Secretary's letter was essentially a skillful argument for the position taken before
the Cabinet. Ibid. pp. 77-81.
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ing back to the colonies the control of the Indian trade, for limiting
the authority of the Superintendents, and for further economies
in the military occupation. But here agreement ceased. The Board
took a strong hostile attitude towards new inland colonies: they
would not improve the fur trade but would prove the end of it;
they would engender the hostility of the Indians, ever jealous of
encroachment on their hunting grounds; they would not be a defense
for the old colonies but would themselves stand in need of it. The
findings of the Board were approved by the Council. And apparently the promoters saw some merit in the decision. A few days
after it was announced, Franklin calmly wrote his son: "The purpose of the new colonies seems at present to be dropped, the change
in the American administration not appearing favorable to it."
If this conclusion of the Board could be accepted with equanimity, surely the argument with which it was supported could not be.
To erect new coolnies in the interior, said the report, would be
something new, a reversal of the policy of 1763 reserving the interior as hunting-grounds for the Indians; contrary indeed, to the
great object of colonizing North America, namely "to improve and
extend the commerce, navigation, and manufactures of this Kingdom, upon which its strength and security depend;" by promoting
the fisheries; by encouraging the production of raw materials to be
exchanged for "perfect manufactures and other products of the
realm," and for supplying provisions and lumber for the island
colonies. Increasing population will, of course, require new lands,
admits the Board, but these have been made available-to the northward in Nova Scotia and southward in the new colonies of East
and West Florida created by the proclamation of 1763. Moreover,
negotiations were in progress for shifting the line of 1763 westward
in order to allow the Middle Colonies to expand "themselves backwards" if and when necessary. Growth of population was thus provided for without planting settlements "above fifteen hundred miles
from the sea," which would probably be compelled to manufacture
for themselves. The theory and practice of British policy was
familiar enough to the colonists, but this blunt official statement
of the theory upon which the colonists were being "pushed around"
for the supposed benefit of the Kingdom or some group in it, was
an affront to self-conscious Americans of the 1760's and '70's.
Franklin, though quiescent now was later to protest hotly against
it when the Board was again blocking westward expansion. One
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effect of the report of March 7, 1768 was a shift of the speculative ventures on the western border to the upper Ohio country
already covered by numerous claims to royal favor. We have
seen that in December the Mississippi Company switched its
petition for 2V2 million acres at the mouth of the Ohio to one for
a like amount lying between 38 and 42 degrees of north latitude
extending from the Alleghenies "westward to the dividing line," and
that Dr. Arthur Lee was sent to London to act as agent for the
Virginians. The record shows that the petition was received, referred to the Board of Trade and there two years later was 'considered," probably in the hope of finding in it grounds for opposing
the more famous petition of Thomas Walpole and associates for
a grant on the Ohio, at the time before the Board.
Already, long before the fate of its Illinois venture was known,
the Wharton group had an enterprise well under way for securing
a large tract of land in the much coveted upper Ohio country. The
project dated back to Pontiac's War. The traders in the Ohio country, most of them Pennsylvanians, suffered heavy losses at the hands
of the Indians and at the close of the war a few of them appealed
to Sir William Johnson and General Amherst for aid in securing
indemnification from the home government. It might seem strange
that in a general disaster in which thousands had lost property,
life and freedom, the traders should be singled out for succor; but
so it was. Sympathetic replies having been received from the Superintendent and the Commander-in-chief, a general meeting was
called near the end of 1763 of traders who had been despoiled, including some of those who had suffered losses in 1754, and the
Philadelphia merchants who had made advances to active traders.
George Croghan who was one of the "sufferers," was preparing to
go to London on semi-official business, and to him the traders
delegated authority to present their claims to the Board of Trade.
He had also a private matter to place before the Board-the confirmation of an "unsolicited" grant of 200,000 acres of land which
the Indians had made to him out of gratitude for his "constant
efforts to maintain peace." To this prayer and that of the traders,
the Board turned a deaf ear. After spending the greater part of 1764
on his mission he returned empty-handed.
The tarders now turned their attention to securing satisfaction
directly from the Indians. Again they turned to Sir William Johnson and again he promised support. In the spring of 1765, pur-
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suant to a request from the Board of Trade to sound out the
Indians with respect to a new line between the colonies and their
reservation a conference with the Six Nations was held at his home.
He found them agreeable to the proposal and so reported to his
superiors. At this meeting he presented the case of the traders to
the Indians and found them willing to make reparation for the
losses they had occasioned. The only way they could do this was
to give the traders part of their land; and this they would do when
the proposed new line was established. How they were brought to
this agreement is not clear. Representatives of the two trading firms
who had suffered most were at the conference-William Trent of
Simons, Trent and Franks, and Samuel Wharton of Boynton,
Wharton and Morgan and from what we know of the ways of the
traders and of these particular men, it is safe to assume that presents
as well as the superintendent's appeal paved the way to a decision.
During the year George Croghan got the same kind of assurance
from the Ohio tribes. They were sorry for the damage they had
caused and were "not only very willing, but anxious to make reparation to . . . the unhappy sufferers." The only way they could do
this was "by a Surrender of a part of their Country, which they
would most cheerfully do, and especially of that part, which lies on
this side of the River Ohio [on the back part of Virginia] as it was
now of no use to them as Hunting Ground." 23 This restitution
must wait, however, on the fixing of the new boundary line. To
hasten this was the next care of the Traders.
They had long to wait; for it was not till the end of 1767 that
instructions were sent to Johnson to treat for the new line and for
the purchase of the new lands to be surrendered to the Crown. Dr.
Franklin discovered the cause of the long delay. In the summer
of 1767 he received a package of letters for the ministry, written by
collusion, thinks Alvord, calling attention to the danger of an
Indian war because of the lawless invasion of the Indian country.
Events were moving faster than the government. The trickle of
population crossing the mountains before the war had increased to
a stream since the end of the Pontiac uprising, in defiance of the
Proclamation of 1763; they were settling upon any lands that
caught their fancy "without leave or license." The very thing was
•• Croghan writing from Philadelphia to B. Franklin, December 12, 1765.
The New Regime. 60-64.

A BELA TED LECTURE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY

27

happening that Burke a few years later told Parliament must happen if the government persisted in its policy of "hedging in the
population," -of keeping "as a liar for wild beasts that land which
God, by a special charter, has given to the children of men." He denounced as "neither prudent nor practicable . . . this avarice of
desolution, this hoarding of a royal wilderness." "Stop your grants."
he said, "and the people will occupy without grants."
All this Lord Shelburne at least seemed to have been conscious
of in 1767 when Franklin handed him the package of letters from
his friends urging, in the interest of law, order and peace, the speedy
settlement of the proposed new boundary line which had received
Indian approval two years before. To Franklin's surprise, Shelburne knew nothing of Sir William's report on the subject; it had
been lost in the Board of Trade. It was later found, however, and
in December 1767 instructions were sent to Johnson to treat with
the Indians for a new boundary and the cession of lands lying
east of it.
And so was set in motion the most important conference yet
held with the Indians. It was called by Sir William Johnson to
meet in September, 1768, at Fort Stanwix where Rome, New York,
now stands. The call went out to the Six Nations, some Canadian
tribes, and the semi-independent tribes on the Ohio in order to
avoid a common cause of treaty violation, that not all tribes concerned had given their assent. It was a long journey for some of
the tribes and it was not till near the end of October that Sir
William thought it wise to convene the congress formally.
In the meanwhile important preparations had been made for
it by the traders. William Trent and Samuel Wharton had spent
the summer visiting various tribes renewing old acquaintances and
making new ones; they were early at Fort Stanwix as the nations
were gathering, looking after the interests of the traders' Company;
and when, on October 24, the Congress was formally opened, they
had reason to be satisfied with the results of their labors. Sir
William's negotiations had also gone well. The new line agreed
upon was more favorable to English interests than he had been
instructed to secure. It ran roughly along the course of the
Allegheny River and down the Ohio as far as the mouth of the
Tennessee. He had been instructed to carry the line only to the
mouth of the Great Kanawha, there to meet the line already agreed
upon with the Southern tribes. The Indians were in a generous

28

BRITISH LAND POLICY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

mood. They wished to confirm the grant of 200,000 acres of land
to George Croghan in lieu of one previously made. They wished
also to compensate the traders for the losses inflicted in 1763 by a
grant of land lying within the territory they proposed to cede
to the Crown; and so they executed a deed for a tract on the Ohio
lying roughly between the Little Kanawha and the Monogahela
containing about 3,500,000 acres, the consideration being 85,916
pounds, 10 shillings, 8 pence, the amount of losses suffered by the
traders. The deed, however, was made, not directly to the tarders,
but to the King, "to and for the only use, benefit, and behoof" of
the traders. The Indians insisted that this sale and the Croghan
grant be made part of the treaty; otherwise they would agree to no
line or cession of territory. Agreement on the traders' grant was
reached on November 3rd, and on the treaty two days later. 24
By this treaty the government had, after five years of fumbling
with the western land question, taken the first step toward a solution of it. A new Indian line was esetablished and the King was
now not only sovereign over but, on payment of the stipulated price
of something over ten thousand pounds, would-be owner of the land
of a vast territory extending from the mountains along the southern
bank of the Ohio almost to its mouth. What now was to be the
policy for disposing of it? The answer to that question was to be
only slowly unfolded over the next six years. Meanwhile grants
were authorized here and there through the royal governors, and
one of magnificent proportions was soon under consideration by
the ministry to be made directly by the King. But it was not till
1774 that a plan for the orderly disposal of land, and so the orderly
western advance of population, was adopted. Our chief concern
is with the large grant just referred to and to that we now turn.
The traders were well aware that Indian grants or sale to private
persons were forbidden by the Proclamation of 1763 and must have
had misgivings about the success of their devious method of securing
their grant through a fictitious sale to the Crown for their "only
use." In any case the King's confirmation would, as they then believed, be required. Soon after the treaty was signed the "Indiana
Company" as the traders' company was now called, decided to send
agents to London to support the "justice and reasonableness" of
•• For the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, see Alvord, Miss. Valley, 11,61-89; Lewis,
G. E. The Indiana Company, 35-72.
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their cause. One of these was William Trent who had been indispensable in the negotiations with the Indians; the other was Samuel
Wharton who was to be chief spokesman for the company in England. He went abroad with introductions to men of influence, and
with power of attorney to act for the company. But when he arrived in London early in 1769 he found that the confirmation of the
treaty was itself in doubt. This was due to the attitude assumed
by Lord Hillsborough, recently appointed colonial secretary and
soon to become president of the Board of Trade. Promptly on
receipt of the treaty he had, without consulting the council, censured
Sir William Johnson for exceeding his authority in running the
new Indian line along the course of the Tennessee River instead
of the Great Kanawha; for including the grants to Croghan and to
the traders in the treaty, and for the large price he had agreed to
pay for the cession. The reason given for opposing the more western
line was that it did not conform with the boundary previously
agreed upon with the southern Indians and would rouse discontent
among them, especially the Cherokees who were believed to have
a better claim than the Six Nations to the land between the
Kanawha and the Tennesse. It is to be kept in mind, however, that
Hillsborough was consistently opposed to encroachment on the
Indian hunting-grounds in the interest of peace and of the preservation of the fur trade, and opposed to the unrestricted western extension of settlement when allowed at all. His position on the
boundary was overruled by the council as to the line and he was
compelled to write Sir William a face-saving letter saying in effect
that the boundary would stand as in the treaty; but the grant to the
traders would not. 25
Samuel Wharton was disappointed but not dismayed by the firm
stand taken by Hillsborough against the Indiana grant. He was,
however, a man of many devices. By midyear 1769 he had taken advantage of the prevalent hunger for American land in London and
had organized a company for the purpose of purchasing western
land as a speculative enterprise. He was extraordinarily successful
in enlisting men of influence, among them Thomas Walpole, merchant-banker and member of Parliament. The petition for the pur•• Documents relating to the Colonial History of New York, Vol. VIII, Hillsborough to Johnson, Jan. 4, 1769,158-163; Board of Trade to the King, April 25,
1769, 161-166; Johnson to Hillsborough, Aug. 21, 179-184.
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chase of 2,400,000 acres of land was, in due course, considered by
the Board of Trade and a hearing called for December 20, 1769.
Lord Hillsborough presided. For some reason the secretary stepped
out of his role as the opponent of westward migration and assumed
that of an expansionist. Why, he asked, did not the petitioners request a larger grant, large enough to form a colony back of the
mountains? The members present promptly accepted the suggestion;
they would be glad to buy a larger tract. Hillsborough said the sale
of land was a treasury matter; the lords of that department were in
session at the moment; he would inquire their pleasure as to the
plan. In a matter of minutes he was able to report them favorable
to it. And so was set going a project of great moment to the many
claimants in the upper Ohio country, including the "suffering
traders of 1763," the Ohio Company, the Mississippi Company, to
the numerous unlawful settlers west of the mountains, and to the
colony of Virginia; a project which by his later opposition to it,
brought about the downfall of Lord Hillsborough.
Events now moved swiftly. Within a week (December 27) a
new and enlarged company was formed to consist of 72 shares and
the boundaries of the desired territory agreed upon. They were
ample enough and suitably chosen for a colony, estimated to embrace 20 million acres. 26 Another week and agreement with the
Treasury had been reached January 4, 1770, as to the price to be
paid-IO,460 pounds, 7 shillings, 3 pence, the cost to the Empire
of the entire cession as agreed upon at Fort Stanwix.
Some minor obstacles were encountered by the company and it
was not till early May that the petition of "Thomas Walpole and
associates" was presented to the King's Council. Arthur Lee was
pressing for action on the Mississippi Company's petition but seems
to have got little or no official encouragement. 27 Edward Montague,
London agent for Virginia, asked for a stay of proceedings on the
grant for the new colony until his government could be heard
from,28 thus raising a question of considerable value to Lord Hills•• The boundaries are given by Alvord, Miss. Valley, II, 103.
Of It should be remembered, however, that it was in this month of May,
1770, that the Board, apparently looking for reasons for rejecting the Walpole
petition, "considered" the petition of the Mississippi Company; this was the
last official notice of it .
•• When news of the proposed grant reached Virginia it seems not to have
induced much action. On April 15, 1770, however, Washington wrote the
governor that the grant "if obtained will, in my humble opinion, give a fatal
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borough a little later. Two days before the Walpole group had
been given its first hearing at the Board of Trade, George Mercer
who for six years had been in London on behalf of the Ohio Company, presented a petition to that body praying it "not to make
any grant within the limits prescribed by the Royal Instructions"
under which the grant of 500,000 acres of land had been authorized
to his company on conditions which it is now ready to fulfill.29
Wharton seems to have thought this claim had some merit. Negotiations were begun with Mercer which resulted in an agreement to
merge the Ohio Company with the Walpole enterprise, the old
company to receive two shares in the new one, now to be called
the Grand Ohio Company. For some reason not apparent Mercer
was also assigned one share, and he was given to understand that
he was to be the governor of the new "province." His action had
been taken without authority from the home members, and there
was a long delay in reporting it to them; and, it may be added,
a much longer delay before any action was taken by them. When
it was taken it was in the form of a repudiation of the transaction.
The next day after the bargain was made with Mercer the new
company presented its petition to the council for authority to purchase the desired territory on the terms already agreed upon with
the Treasury. On May 25, 1770, it was sent to the Board of Trade
for study and recommendations, and there it was to be lodged for
two years.
In view of the fact that their petition had been acted upon
favorably by two important government agencies, the members of
the Grand Ohio Company seem warranted in expecting the Board
of Trade to act promptly. That they did not was due to the influence of Lord Hillsborough, Colonial Secretary, and the proposer of the new colony. Sensing that the sale of the territory was
in high favor, he tried first to induce other officers to sit in with the
Board and thus share the responsibility for decisions reached on so
important a question. Another more serviceable reason for delay
was the desire to protect the interests of Virginia. That he was
blow to the interests of this country." This did not prevent him from trying
later to buy shares in the new company. On Nov. 24, 1770, he wrote George
Croghan offering to buy his share and asking the price. A year later he wrote
George Mercer, inquiring the price of shares in London. Writings III. 9, 26, and
72.
•• Kenneth P. Bailey. The Ohio Company of Virginia, Appendix 317.
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able to postpone action so long is the more remarkable when the
character of the membership of the company is conisdered. The
list of members30 marks it as more English than American; Samuel
Wharton in his search for men of "influence" had done well. At
the head of the list stands the name of the Earl of Hertford, who
as Lord Chamberlain was supposed to have much influence with
the King. There was Lord Camden, the Lord Chancellor "who,"'
says Alvord, "took shares in the company and at every crisis was a
valued adviser." Two other members of the higher nobility held
shares though their names do not appear in the list; Lord Rochford
and the Earl of Gower, both members of the Privy Council. Of
the commonalty there was George Grenville of Stamp Act fame
whose share, after his death, was held by his brother, Earl Temple;
Thomas Bradshaw, Under-Secretary of the Treasury, who was credited at the time with having carried "the land company through its
early stages" (Alvord II. 98); there was of course the name of
Thomas Walpole whose political and financial standing has already
been noted; and it was believed that other names in the list were
covers for men high in official life.
Nor were the American members wanting in weight. There was
Sir William Johnson, much trusted and highly honored appointee
of the Crown who was in constant communication with the commanding General on this side and the colonial office in London;
there were the two Franklins, father and son, both appointees of
the Crown, the one as assistant postmaster general in America, the
other as royal governor of New Jersey; and Samuel Wharton who
had business connections in London and whose influence there is
shown by the character of the men he enlisted in his enterprise.
The name of the Indiana Company whose affairs took him to London does not appear on the list; but at the reorganization at which
the elder Franklin presided, at the meeting of December 27, 1769,
it was "unanimously agreed to reserve to the Indiana Company and
to George Croghan their respective grants." 31 In addition to this
the name of Croghan appears on the list as a member in his own
right as does that of Samuel Wharton, his father, and each of three
brothers.
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Alvord, Miss. Valley, II, 98.
Lewis, The Indiana Company, 92.
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In spite of this array of men of "influence," Lord Hillsborough
was able to defer action on the petition for many months. It was
only when the King let it be known that he was interested to know
when a report on the new colony could be expected that the Board
acted. Its report on the Walpole petition was sent to the Council
April 15, 1772. As must have been expected, the report recommended that the prayer of the memorialists be denied. The supporting argument was much the same as that used in 1768 against erecting colonies in the Illinois country. Indeed, many paragraphs of
the earlier report were lifted verbatim from it for use in the present
one. In accord with established colonial policy, it ran, the proclamation line of 1763 had set the limit of western settlement "at such a
distance from the seacoast, as that all settlements should lie within
reach of the trade and commerce of this Kingdom;" and notwithstanding that the Fort Stanwix line had reduced the hunting
grounds of the Indians it did not enlarge the area in which settlements could be made, for the prohibition against settlement west
of the 1763 line remained unchanged. That in fact was true, and
Hillsborough, speaking for the Board, would have the temporary
prohibition of that year made permanent.
One can well imagine that when Wharton saw the report he
rubbed his hands in glee and said: "Now hath the Lord delivered
him into mine hands." Arguments that had weight as against
planting colonies on the Mississippi in 1768, had little or no
relevancy as against the Vandalia Colony in 1772 where there
were already some 30,000 settlers in active commercial communication with the seaboard; and when on July 1, the council, at the
instance of Lord Gower, permitted the petitioners to state their
case, Wharton took full advantage of the many weaknesses in Hillsborough's position. His Observations on the Foregoing Report,82
supplemented by his ready response to questions asked, left little
of merit in the argument in the report. The Council apparently
took little time in reaching a decision in the matter. Contrary to
the Secretary's recommendation it advised the King to grant the
petition, and directed the Board of Trade to prepare a form of
•• Writings of Benjamin Franklin, 5:467-478 for the Report; Obseroations
on the Foregoing Report, 479 If. This pamphlet long believed to be by Franklin was actually written by Wharton. Alvord, Miss. Valley, 2:132n. See also Franklin's Writings, 5:410.
.

34

BRITISH LAND POLICY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

government for the new colony. Hillsborough had declared that
rather than work out the details for making effective such a grant
he would resign. In August he reluctantly gave up his office of
Colonial Secretary and retired from the cabinet.
Whether the decision of the Council was due to Wharton's
masterly presentation of the petitioners' case; to the self-interest of
council members Gower and Rochford; to a recognition of the
colony as in the national interest; or to the "exigencies of British
politics" at the moment, who can tell? It seems probably that they
each had some part in determining the Council's action. Alvord's
analysis of the situation is of special importance, however, to our
inquiry. He points out that just at this time there was a fractional
conspiracy on foot to bring about the fall of the North ministry.
The scheme was to humiliate the Colonial Secretary, the "best and
firmest friend of North," force him to resign, and so bring about
the downfall of the prime minister. This factional scheming was
the easier and safer because of the general dislike of Hillsborough
by his fellow ministers, and because the King was believed to be
tired of the Secretary and "his administration which had weakened
the affection and respect of the colonies for a royal government."
The conspiracy failed of its main purpose; North treated the
resignation as purely voluntary and remained in office-remained
to inject, as it turned out, the affairs of the East India Company
into the already delicate American situation.
Lord Dartmouth succeeded Hillsborough as Colonial Secretary
and President of the Board of Trade. His appointment was altogether to the liking of the Walpole associates. His attitude toward
the colonies was friendly, he was known to be in favor of westward
expansion, and was himself the owner of 40,000 acres of land in
West Florida. Indeed, according to Alvord, "he had been selected
with the avowed purpose of forwarding the enterprise on the upper
Ohio." (Miss. Val. II, 149). The Board received the petition the
day Dartmouth took office with instructions to report on such
reservations in the grant as seemed advisable, and to prepare a
constitution for the new colony soon to be called Vandalia.
The Board of Trade proceded deliberately and it was not till
May of 1773 that it reported to the Council. There were reasons
for the delay. The "opposition" was performing its function of
opposing whatever the government proposed; General Gage writing
from New York questioned the wisdom of western settlement on
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the usual anti-expansionist grounds and he was soon in London
where he "was thought to have great influence;" there was an undercurrent of hostile opinion abroad in the city, partly because so many
public officials were due to become beneficiaries of the grant as to
give the whole enterprise the appearance of a "job." Moreover, the
voice of Virginia was being heard in firmer tones through its new
governor, Lord Dunmore. Nevertheless, the Board, after almost a
year, made its report to the Council on May 6, 1773.
Some important reservations in the grant were recommended.
All legal settlements on the grant prior to the day negotiations
were begun with the Treasury were to be respected. Reservation was
made of the 200,000 acres promised under the Dinwiddie proclamation of 1754. Instead of the purchase price being paid by installments over five years the whole was to be paid the day the title
was passed; and it was stipulated that the proprietors were to pay
the expense of setting up and maintaining the conony. The
boundaries of the colony were extended beyond those prayed for in
the petition, though apparently without changing the area of the
grant. The western boundary was to follow the course of the
Kentucky River, and another slice was taken of Virginia territory
by a shift of the southern boundary, which, as Alvord points out,
cut that colony off from contact with the West.
The Council, on receiving the report, referred it to a special
committee consisting of Lords Gower and Rochford, both members
of the company, and Lord Dartmouth. It was not expected that such
a committee would reach any conclusions adverse to the interests of
the Grand Ohio Company. It did not. Early in July the council
sent the petition to the Attorney General and the Solicitor General
for a legal check-up with instructions to prepare the grant in form
for the King's signature. The law officers found plenty to check.
On one pretext or another, they retained the papers until the
King was in a fair way to having no land in the colonies to grant.
Alvord has tried to ferret out, without much success it must be
said, the political influences back of the law officers' "masterly inactivity." All we can safely say is that they "stalled."

During the year 1773, the ministry decided upon two measures
which proved to be disturbers of the relative quiet prevailing at the
time in the colonies. One had to do with a new method of dispos-
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ing of crown lands to be discussed presently; the other was a plan
for aiding the East Indian Company in finding an enlarged market
for its tea in the colonies. The practical working of this second
measure is a familiar story and need not detain us. When Thomas
Wharton saw the extremes to which the Americans went in their
opposition to landing the tea, he feared a political reaction in
London injurious to colonial interests including the enterprise
on the upper Ohio, and he wrote his brother Samuel: "I ... most
ardently wish thou may be in possession of the grant, before the
arrival of full accounts respecting the conduct of the Americans
touching the tea, as I fear it will strengthen our enemies to oppose
the completion thereof." 33 It may well have done so. The "Bloomsbury Gang," as the followers of Lord Bedford were called, a faction
always hostile to the colonies, joined in the general clamor for laws
that would put the Americans in their proper place. They had
supported the two tax laws and opposed their repeal. It was at their
insistence that the Tea Tax was retained and that the Declaratory
Act was passed. The tea affair gave the occasion for invoking that
Act. There followed logically enough the retaliatory acts, the first
Continental Congress, and the second Congress. In the summer
of 1774 Wharton and Walpole sent a memorial to the King praying
for the early completion of the grant. What, if any action was
taken on the memorial I do not know; but in Mayor June, 1775,
two years after receiving the papers, the attorney general and the
solicitor general returned the grant ready for the King's signature.
It was never signed; hostilities had begun.
REFORM OF THE LAND SYSTEM, 1774
While the Walpole grant was pending, the ministry for the first
time gave serious thought to the reform of the imperial land policy.
The reform so far as it went at this time had to do mainly with
changes in the terms and method of disposing of crown lands. Before considering these changes, it will be convenient to take a look
at the system which had grown up during a century and a half.
You will recall that when the London Company was dispossessed
of Virginia in the 1620's, the government took over with the land
certain methods of disposal which had recently been adopted by
the company. The company was land-rich; land was the cheap
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factor of production and it was freely used to secure the scarce
factor, labor. Under the "reform" administration of Sir Edwin
Sandys in 1619, the company put in operation a five year plan for
recruiting the colony. Shortly before it had declared its first
"dividend" in land to the "old adventurers," that is to shareholders and to those who had adventured their persons in the
colony, and a second division or dividend in land was promised
"when the first shall be sufficiently peopled." To further encourage
the peopling of the colony the old members were now promised
the old adventurers' 50 acres for each person transported to Virginia
before mid-summer, 1625, and as much more when the first allotment should be peopled. All these grants were to be in absolute
ownership. New subscribers before this date were promised dividends the same as the old adventurers, except that grants made on
the basis of persons transported were to be subject to an annual
rent of 12 pence per 50 acres. "Planters," that is settlers going out
at their own expense, were promised 50 acres each in his own right
at the first division, and, this "being peopled," the same at the
second division. They too, were allowed 50 acres for each person
they transported, subject, of course, to the 12 pence rent. Thus
appeared in America this vestige of feudalism, the "quit-rent."
The plan, together with certain other reforms set in operation
by Sandys, worked well. From 1607 to 1618 about 1800 persons had
gone to reside in the colony; from 1619 to 1624 the number was
4,749. (Brown, The First Republic, 285, 612). The practice of
granting land for "head-rights" was adopted by the Crown, and
with modifications, was continued to the eve of the Revolution. It
fitted in with the indented servant system by which the colonies
were in large part peopled.
In the quit-rents the Crown had a long established source of
revenue which though unquestioned, was, nevertheless a constant
source of friction-over the time and place of collection, the medium
of payment, and the use to which the revenue was put. Because of
lax administration, official venality, and dishonest land owners,
the rents were usually in arrears and the yield disappointingly
small. Efforts to improve the administration had generally been
futile. Two devices for escaping payment may be mentioned. One
grew out of the method of surveying and designating boundaries of
grants, which was so crude that errors in calculating acreages might
honestly be made. But the errors were so great in some cases,
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probably in many, as to indicate fraud. Bond, in his Quit Rent
System, cites, as an example, a 1000 acre grant surveyed and so
listed on the rent-roll; a re-survey showed there were 5,000 acres in
the track. Fitzpatrick tells of a grant of 13,986 acres in the Illinois
country, which was found later to contain 30,000 acres. Another
method of evasion was described by Governor DinwiddIe. Grantees
would delay for long periods taking out their patents and thus avoid
placing their land on the tax roll. He declared in 1754, that a
million acres in Virginia were thus escaping rent payments. Bond
found three tracts in New York of perhaps more than a million
acres each which paid only a nominal rent.
If these frauds could be practiced in the settled regions, what a
field for similar frauds was opened when grants began to be made
beyond the mountains! Lord Shelburne when he became secretary
of state, understood the situation and proposed to do something
about it. As already noted, one of the chief concerns of every
ministry of the period was to find ways of reducing imperial expenses
in the colonies, or increasing the revenue for them or both. Shelburne shared this concern and as already pointed out he was consistently opposed to all tax proposals. The most obvious way to
increase the revenue, he wrote General Gage, was "by taking care
of the quit-rents and by turning the grants of lands to real benefit."
The implication here is, that he would charge a price for the King's
land in place of the usual nominal sum paid. Thus he thought an
"American fund to defray American expenses in part or in whole,"
could be provided.34 Accordingly, in the year of the repeal of the
Stamp Act, he set afoot an inquiry into all aspects of land grants
and rents. "Nothing can be more reasonable than that the proprietors of large tracks ... should either pay their quit-rents punctually
for the time to come, or relinquish their grant in favor of those
who will." He sought information regarding the manner of making
grants with a view to future policy, "particularly in the new and
conquered provinces," such as "would lighten the burden which
lies upon the Mother Country." Before the inquiry was completed,
Shelburne was out of power and colonial affairs were dominated
by Lord Hillsborough whose chief concern in the new provinces
was to reserve them as hunting-grounds; an idea he held to the day

•• Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Shelburne, I, pp. 305-7.
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he was over-ruled by the Council in the Walpole matter and had
to resign.
Mention has been made of a land reform measure set on foot in
1773. Whether it grew out of a belated recognition of the merit
in Shelburne's idea of "turning the grants of lands to a real benefit;"
or was suggested by the unexpected and novel offer of the Walpole
associates to pay a substantial price for their grant; or, whether it
came as a happy thought to some one that western lands so eagerly
sought after had a market value, I do not know. At any rate the
Board of Trade was instructed to bring in a report on the subject,
and in April, 1773, the colonial governors were instructed to refrain from passing any patents or issuing any permits of survey,
until the King's pleasure was known, on pain of dismissal.
The King's pleasure was made known in his instructions to the
Royal Governors on February 3, 1774.35 All previous instructions
relating to the laying out and granting of lands were revoked and
annulled. The governor, surveyor general, secretary, and receiver
general of quit-rents, in each province were directed to layoff in
districts such lands as it would be "most advantageous to the public
interest and welfare" to have settled and improved. They were
directed to "cause actual surveys" to be made of lots containing
not more than 1,000, and not less than 100 acres, and these were
to be numbered and a map made for the district. The lands thus
laid off were to be offered for sale at a time and place fixed by the
officers named and sold to the "best bidder," but only after being
duly advertised for four months, and at a price not less than six
pence sterling per acre, and reserving an annual quit-rent of one
half penny sterling per acre; and there was a reservation not of the
usual royal fifth, but of all mines of gold, silver, and precious
stones." 36
35 Documents Relating to the Colonial History ot New York, VIII, 409-413;
S. E. Morison, Documents Relating to the American Revolution, 97-98.
S. Note that the old rate was 10 shillings per 100 acres, and 2 shillings quit
rents per 100 acres in Virginia. The new rates figure out a price of 50 shillings,
and a quit-rent of 4 shillings per hundred acres, not in tobacco or currency but
in sterling. The new regulations annulled the method of acquiring land by
"head-rights." But George Mason would not have it so. In June, 1774, he
petitioned the governor and Council of Virginia for permission to take up land
"upon the western waters" on the presentation of certificates of "importation
rights" he had bought at great expense. He argued that this method of acquiring land had been authorized by the Charter of 1609 and had been reaffirmed by
Charles II; that "Titles to a great part of the lands of this Colony have been
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This new land policy must have been pleasing to Lord Shelburne. Provision was at last made for "turning the grants of land
to real benefit." The logical next step would be to collect the quitrents due by the terms of previous grants; and the English temper
at the time was such that the long over-due reform of that system
might be expected to follow.37 And so would be created an "American fund for the American colonies" from sources to which the
Crown had an unquestioned right.
Unquestioned till this fateful year of 1774. When it became
certain that a continental congress would convene to take counsel
concerning "many unwarrantable encroachments and usurpations
of Parliament," Thomas Jefferson prepared what he hoped would
become the instructions to the Virginia delegates to that meeting.
Being regarded as too bold for the occasion, they were not so used,
but were later printed under the title, A Summary View of the
Rights of British America. He later, in his Autobiography, admitted that the ideas in the document were a leap too far aheadtwo years ahead, as events proved. We may leave aside his denunciation of the navigation acts and the recent laws which had
roused the colonies to united action except to note that he denouncgranted on this basis; and that the King 'ever observant of the Law' could not
have intended that his regulations should 'affect land due ... under the royal
charter:" Dunmore had already been rebuked by Lord Dartmouth for exceeding his authority in making grants and no action was taken at this time.
Under a law drafted by Jefferson and Mason in 1779. the old terms for acquiring land were restored including purchase with head rights. Papers of Thomas
Jefferson, Vol. I, 112-115. Princeton.
87 I have come upon no documentary evidence that the ministry contemplated
such a step at the time; nor have I found signs of alarm in Virginia over the
probability that it would be taken. It should be remembered. however. that Lord
Shelburne in his letter to Gage in 1766 had said that if land owners did not
pay the rent due the Crown. they ought to surrender ~heir holdings to someone who would; and that one of the grievances of Jefferson in the Summary View
was that under a law of George II, land in the colonies could be seized for debt.
One wonders if, in this year, 1774, when the ministry for the first time turned
seriously to the land for revenue, Jefferson may not have had in mind the
prospect of a tightening up of the administration, re-surveys, and the possible
seizure of land to satisfy debts due to the Crown. A strict administration of the
old rents would affect adversely more Virginians probably than the doubling of
the rent in new grants beyond the mountains. Even in New England where
there were no quit-rents there seems to have been fear they might be imposed.
"Hitherto many of the Colonists have been free from quit-rents; but if the
breath of a British House of Commons can originate an Act for taking away
all our money, our lands will go next or be subject to rack rents." (Boston
Town Meeting. November 1772.)
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ed them not merely because of the injury they inflicted. "The true
ground" he said, "on which we declare these acts void is, that the
British parliament has no right to exercise its authority over us."
Our present interest in the Summary View lies in the conception
of British land policy held by Jefferson. At three different points,
he discusses as many aspects of the subject:
1. Claiming the same rights and immunities for Americans as
were enjoyed by Englishmen, he protests against an Act passed during the reign of George II "by which American lands are made
subject to the demands of British creditors while their own lands
remained unanswerable for their debts." This law was passed no
doubt as an aid to British creditors suing for the collection of
private mercantile debts; but, as Bond points out, distraint was
about the only means the government had for the collection of
arrears in quit-rents. It seems to have been used sparingly if at all.
2. Jefferson's second point had to do with the arbitrary dismemberment, by the Stuart princes, of "this country which had been
acquired by the lives and labor of individual adventurers," parting
it out and distributing it to favorites and followers of their fortunes,
and erecting them into distinct and independent governments. This
was peculiarly a Virginia grievance. In this way had Virginia been
"parted" and Maryland "erected." In this way was it now proposed
to set up the Vandalia government; in this way all that part of
Virginia north of the Ohio it was now proposed to attach to another
colony.3s But, says Jefferson, it is believed that those acts of Stuart
despotism "his Majesty's prudence and understanding will prevent
him from imitating at this day; as no exercise of such power of
dividing and dismembering a country, has ever occurred in his
Majesty's realm 6f England though now of very ancient standing;
nor could it be justified or acquiesced under there, or in any part
of his Majesty's empire."
3. Jefferson would have the delegates "remind the King of an
error which at a very early period had crept in as to the nature of
our land holding. The error had to do with the ownership and
disposal of the soil. It had long been held that "all land in England was held either mediately or immediately of the Crown." The
idea was borrowed from those holdings which were truly feudal;
.S The Walpole grant, and the Quebec Act were both pending when Jefferson wrote, The Quebec Act passed the Lords June 17, 1774, signed June 22.
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that is had been surrendered to the King at the time of the Conquest and by him "granted out subject to feudal duties." This
happened to a large part of the land of the kingdom. But much
was left in the hands of Saxons who "held their lands as they did
their personal property, in absolute dominion, disencumbered with
any superior." These lands were by law made liable to military
duties as were the feuds; but they were never surrendered to a
King, "they were never derived from his grants, and therefore not
holden of him." These lands, Jefferson held, still form the basis
or groundwork of the Common law, to prevail wherever the exception (the feuds) have not been taken. They prevail in this country.
America was not conquered by William the Norman, nor its lands
surrendered to him or to any of his successors; the tenure there is
allodial. But the early settlers were farmers, not lawyers, and they
accepted grants on the "fictitious principle that all lands belong
originally to the King." As long as grants were made for small sums
and rents were reasonable, there "was no inducement to arrest the
error ... but his majesty has lately taken it upon himself to advance the terms of purchase and of holding to the double of what
they were; by which means the acquisition of lands being rendered
difficult, the population of our country is likely to be checked."
It is time, therefore, for us to lay this matter before his Majesty, and
to declare that he has no right to grant lands of himself. It would
seem to follow, if he had no right to grant, he had no right to
collect quit-rents.
So far as I can learn Virginia was the only colony in which the
British land policy was put forward as a "grievance" in the revolutionary movement, and there it did not gain official recognition.
It was not mentioned in the Declarations and Resolves of the first
Continental Congress, but it appears in the Declaration of Independence:
"He has endeavored to prevent the population of these States;
for that purpose obstructing the laws for Naturalization of Foreigners, refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither,
and by raising the conditions of new appropriations of land."
(Italics supplied.)
The Quebec Act, however, furnished ample grounds for complaint against the government's land policy. Here was an instance
of that "parting" the territory of one government and attaching it
to another which Jefferson thought his majesty's prudence would
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keep him from consummating. But it was not a good point to raise
in the Declaration; for there were men in the Congress and throughout the country who scouted Virginia's claim to the region north
of the Ohio. His complaint was given a political turn-that the Act
abolishes the free system of English laws in Canada, establishing an
arbitrary government there and "extending its boundaries so as to
render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the
same absolute rule into these colonies."
This idea was not of American origin; it was voiced in Parliament during the debate by men of such character that they cannot
be regarded as mere mouthpieces of the opposition. The Quebec
Act has long been grouped in our school books with the coercive
acts of 1774, and not unnaturally so in view of its time relationship
to the whole batch of legislation of that year. The government at
the time and historians ever since have denied any punitive intent,
none more convincingly than Reginald Coupland in his The Quebec
Act. Oxford. 1925. He points out that this long over-due measure
had been in preparation long before the occasion for retaliation
arose; that the religious toleration given the Catholics was in accord with the treaty and was anyway justified by its own merit;
that the French population were unfitted for and did not want
representative government; and that the continuance of the French
Civil law without trial by jury was both wise, and under the circumstances, necessary. It was these provisions that roused most
criticism at home and among the English and Scotch in Canada who
had come in to take over the French fur trade. But in addition to
these abhorrent provisions, the Americans found their pride injured
and their political and economic interests ignored by the extension
of the Province southward to the Ohio.
It has been contended that the colonies had no ground for complaint since the Act guaranteed the integrity of their boundaries and
the government had steadily been vacating Indian claims and opening them to occupation. This is true in one notable case north of
the Ohio and more notably true in the South; but even there much
of the occupation had been lawless and patents were secured through
the weakness or the collusion of royal officials. North of the river
the ban at the Proclamation line continued and was sometimes
violated by the speculators as in the case of the Wabash enterprise
and by settlers in the upper Ohio region.
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The colonists may be pardoned for not taking the assurance given
in the Act at its face value. There was no such guarantee in it as
it passed the Lords. Debate on it began in the Commons on May
26. On May 31, Thomas Penn presented a petition there "against
the boundary provisions of the Bill," although that of Pennsylvania
had, it seems, been adequately safeguarded. It was probably this
petition that led the Commons to adopt amendments, later agreed
to in the other chamber, providing that nothing in the Act should
"affect the Boundaries of any other Colonies"; and further that
nothing in it should be construed to alter "any Right, or Possession
derived under any Grant ... or to Lands within the said Province,
or the Provinces thereto adjoining." This seems reassuring, but
it is not strange that the Atlantic colonies which for a hundred or
a hundred and fifty years had been nursing the idea of sea-ta-sea
charter grants, were not impressed, in view of the unquestioned
purpose of the Act to establish a civil government from Quebec
over their hinterland. It is not necessary for us to pass judgment
upon the validity of their "claims" and "rights" beyond the mountains. Our concern is with the causes, reasons, which impelled loyal
subjects, especially Virginians, to become rebels. Coupland may
be right in saying that the Revolution would have occurred had
there been no Quebec Act; but there can be no question that it
was a contributing factor.
Regardless of what, if any, safeguard was really given by the
"saving clause" of the Act, there were provisions in and with it
affecting the material interests of an increasing number of Americans, speculators, traders and settlers alike, whose faces were turned
toward the west. Notwithstanding the failure of the imperial control set up in 1763 for the whole Mississippi Valley, the Act reaffirmed that policy for the Northwest. This was done with the
sincere purpose, doubtless, of protecting the interests of the Indians;
and we may be certain for the protection of England's economic interests. Even before the Act went into effect the discredited rules
of 1764 for regulating the Indian trade were re-established there
and made a part of the law of the land,39 to be administered of
.8 Through the instructions sent by Lord Dartmouth to Governor Carleton,
January 3, 1775. Documents Relating the Constitutional History of Camzda,
614-620. The regulations may also be found in New York Colonial Documents,
6:903, and in Illinois Historical Collections, 10:273 If.
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course from Quebec. Likewise, if and when districts were opened
for occupation, surveyed, and offered for sale, under the new land
instructions of 1774, it would be done by the King's officers at
Quebec, far removed from the influence of the most likely purchasers. It is little wonder, therefore, that the land-minded Richard
Henry Lee regarded the Quebec Act as the most intolerable of the
Intolerable Acts.
All this, however, was borrowing trouble. On June 7, 1775,
Dartmouth wrote Carleton: "I have also the satisfaction to acquaint
you, that an Account published here for a Skirmish between the
King's Troops and the Provincials in the neighborhood of Boston
.. _ has had no other effect than to increase that Indignation, which
every Friend to Government feels for the Insult offered the Constitution, in the rebellious Resistance to the Authority of Parliament by the People of North America."
With the Declaration of Independence, the western question
which had so long bedeviled the ministry, became an American
question, whether for the States or the central government remained
to be decided. As everyone knows the decision was in favor of the
central government-a price paid by the "landed" states for union
under the Articles. The agreement to surrender the State claims in
the west was reached in 1781. It was not till 1784 that the Congress
passed its great land ordinance, and not till 1787 that the greater
ordinance for governing the Northwest Territory was enacted. In
the meantime the speculators and the home seekers were having
pretty much their own way in the West. South of the Ohio, Virginia successfully contested the claim of Richard Henderson to a
part of Kentucky. North of the Ohio, Governor Patrick Henry
strengthened the State's Charter claim by furnishing George Rogers
Clark with men and money for his so-called "Conquest of the Northwest," while at the same time pleading inability to supply the State's
quota of men and funds for an expedition planned by the Congress in the same region. In 1779, under a law drafted by Jefferson
and Mason, the State opened a land office and, disregarding the
protest of the Congress against such action while the question of
jurisdiction was pending, began granting lands west of the mountains at the old Virginia rates. By the close of the Revolution some
4000 grants had been made aggregating more than a million and
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a quarter acres, 80 per cent of it going to Virginians,40 10,000 acres
going to Patrick Henry.
The transfer of state claims to the central government was not
effected without a good deal of bargaining and delay. Some concessions were made especially to Virginia and to Connecticut. It
was not completed till 1805. By that time, under the rule of unrestricted migration, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio had become
populous enough to be admitted into the Union as states. One
wonders what, in the face of this "general inclination to settlement," as Shelburne called it, would have been the outcome of
England's renewed attempt to regulate the westward movement
under the Instructions of 1774.
What, now, shall we say in answer to Alvord's question: Did
England like France lose an empire by trying to confine the colonists
between the Alleghenies and the sea? Or, put in another way: Was
England's policy with respect to the Mississippi Valley a determining
factor in bringing about the revolt of the colonies? Your economic
determinist could make a plausible argument that it was. He
could assume (and would not be far wrong) that Virginia was
necessary to a successful revolt; that Virginia's ties to the mother
country were closer and apparently more enduring than those of
any other colony, and that some special reason must be found to
explain why this most trusted and loyal colony joined with the
constitutionally non-conformist colonies at the north, and, indeed,
took a leading part in the revolution. He could point out that
Virginia had such a grievance in Great Britain's western policy.
He could show that no sooner had the French barrier been removed
than the King's proclamation set up a legal barrier-staying the
"Course of Empire"; that the restriction came to be felt in all the
colonies, but most in Virginia, first by her speculators, later by
'0 Isaac S. Harrell. Loyalism in Virginia, pp. 18-22. The land law of 1779
criticized as belying .Jefferson's professed interest in disposing of the western
lands to those who would occupy and use them thus assuring more equal
distribution of ownership; this on the ground that million acre tracts were
later acquired in the region covered by the law. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson,
Vol. 2, 133, prints the draft as prepared by Jefferson and Mason, with copious
notes. It giVeS every indication of being designed to promote small holdings.
In the course of its passage the bill underwent many changes in the interest
of the land companies and other speculators. The bill and the law provided
for purchases with "importation-rights" in which Mason was much interested.
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h()~e-seekers; that her speculators were men of vision, posilioQ.. and
influence but their petitions for land were treated with scant courtesy, lmd that of the Mississippi Company was simply ignored. The
Ohio Company's London agents during five or six years of effort
could never get a hearing on the company's request for a reaffirmation of its grant or for remuneration for the destruction of
its property by the King's army. And yet the King's officers acquiesced in, indeed promoted, the Indiana grant to the "suffering
traders" of Pennsylvania, to be carved out of Virginia territory.
This was in 1768. Two years later the King gave his assent to the
sale of 20 or 30 million acres of Virginia territory to a company of
Pennsylvanians and land-hungry Britons high in official life, and
to the erection of an independent colony there, with boundaries
so fixed that the "old Dominion" was cut off from all contact with
the West. And finally, the Quebec Act put an end to her claims
north of the Ohio.
Your economic determinist could go on to show that it was a
Virginian who first questioned publicly the King's ownership of
unappropriated lands; it was a Virginian who introduced in the
Continental Congress at the behest of an extra-legal convention at
Williamsburg, the resolution of June 7, 1776, declaring that these
colonies are and of right ought to be free and independent states;
it was a Virginian who drafted the formal Declaration adopted a
month later; and it was a Virginian who was placed at the head
of the army. All this is true; and it is also true that all the men
named and many more had a deep interest in England's management of the great inland region at their back door.
But, while the King was doubtless right in saying tha.t Hillsborough's administration of the West "had weakened the alIection
and respect of the colonies for a royal government," it does not
speU Qut the answer implied in Alford's question. That would be
too simple an answer to a complex problem. The "speculators,"
influential as they were, were too few in number to carry their own
colony with them on the question of opening the West to exploitation. There were many men of influence who were opposed or
luke warm on that issue. These, the speculators, and people
throughout the colonies, had other economic grievances, if we must
have "economic causes of the Revolution." It was Patrick Henry,
a western land speculator later if not at the time, who in 1765
warned the King that Charles I had his Cromwell. The Virginians
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entered into a non-importation agreement in protest against the
Townshend act in its amended form retaining the tax on tea and
into the Continental Association of 1774; most of the colonists felt
themselves injured by parliamentary interference with their paper
currency designed as they knew to repair their loss of specie caused
by British commercial regulation, but designed, it was currently
believed in England, to cheat their creditors on that side_ Out of
deference to those who in our own time hold latitudinarian views
concerning "property," who think it less noble to contend for
property rights than to contend for personal and political rights,
it may be said that there were plenty of violations of both these
classes of rights. One theme that ran through all the controversy
was the right to be treated as Englishmen; they were consistently
treated as colonials-as underlings. John Adams even in his old
age could not think of the treatment of the Virginians during the
French and Indian War without growing red in the face with indignation. Each colony had a legislature but its enactments were
regularly suspended till the pleasure of the King was made known;
and at any moment, on the least sign of protest against regulations
imposed upon them, the members could be, and often were, sent
home like naughty school boys. It is little wonder that they began
to inquire into the source of the authority exercised over them.
"Can anyone reason be given," asked Jefferson, "why 160,000 electors in the island of Great Britain should give law to four million
in these states. . . ." It was not, he said, because of the injury
wrought by the acts of trade and navigation that we protest against
them. "The true ground on which we declare these acts void is
that the British parliament has no right to exercise authority over
us. . . . The exercise of free trade with other parts of the world
[belonged to them] as of natural right."
In arriving at these revolutionary conclusions the colonists were
guided by the prevailing philosophy of the time. Where the positive
law was against them, they appealed to a higher law-"natural
law." The "rights" contended for in the Declaration and Resolves
of 1774 were theirs "by the immutable laws of nature, the principles
of the English Constitution, and our several charters or compacts."
George Mason leaned heavily on the doctrine in the Virginia bill
of rights: "All men are by nature equally free and independent
and have certain inherent rights of which, when they enter into a
state of society, they cannot by any compact divest their posterity."
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One will not go far in the writings of the period without coming
upon variants of these terms; and he will not, I think, be able to
understand and appraise the movement for separation without some
knowledge of the philosophy back of them.
Carl Becker, more than most American historians, appreciated
this and in his Declaration of Independence, dealt with the subject
at some length. "That there is a 'natural order' in the world," he
says, "explicitly designed by God for the guidance of mankind;
that the 'laws' of this natural order may be discovered by reason;
that these laws so discovered furnish a reliable and immutable
standard for testing the ideas, the conduct, and the institutions of
men-these were the accepted premises, the preconceptions, of most
eighteenth-century thinking, not only in America but also in England and France." These views were held by jurists, by philosophers,
by theologians, and by the common man. Blacktone stated the
central doctrine in no uncertain terms: "This law of nature," he
says, "being coeval with man and dictated by God himself, is
superior to any other; no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive their force and
authority from this origin."
Such a doctrine is a ready-made instrument of revolution. It
was, indeed, elaborated by John Locke in his Two Treatises of
Civil Government as a refutation of the doctrine of the divine right
of Kings which he regarded as a ready-made instrument of tyranny,
and was used to justify the English Revolution of 1688. It was
from the writings of Locke, especially his Second Treatise, that the
colonists received their instruction in the doctrine of Natural
Rights. How well they were instructed will be clear when you
compare the literature of the period with Locke's writings.
Briefly, the argument of the Second Treatise runs as follows:
Before there was any government men were in the state of freedom and equality, no one having authority over another, each
in a sense a law unto himself, subject only to the law of nature;
for "the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it; and
reason which is that law teaches all mankind ... that being all
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his
life, health, liberty, or possessions." If anyone violates this law,
he may be punished by the injured party "not according to the
passionate heats ... of his own will," but only to the extent required to secure reparation and to restrain. There being ob-
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vious inconveniences and limitations in such a state, and mankind "being but in ill condition while they remain in it, are
quickly driven into society ... 'tis not every compact that puts
an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one
of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and
make one body politic." They surrender their "executive
power," each to redress his own injuries, agree to set up a
"legislative" to make rules of action, and an "executive" to
enforce them; "all this directed to no other end but the peace,
safety, and public good." The "legislative" is the supreme
authority in the community; but it is not absolute. There remains still in the people a supreme authority to alter the "legislative" when they act contrary to the trust reposed in them."
They betray their trust when they endeavor to invade the
property of the subject, and to make themselves ... masters or
arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the
people." And so of the executive "when he sets up his awn
arbitrary will in place of the laws"; by hindering the legislature
from assembling or from acting freely; or when "he employs
the force, treasure and offices of the society to corrupt the representatives of the society," or by "solicitations, threats, promises,"
brings in legislators "who have promised beforehand what to
vote and what to enact." By such acts he puts himself "in a state
of war against the people" who are thus "absolved from further
obedience and left to the common refuge which God has provided for all men against force and violence."
Who, now, shall decide when the trust has been violated?
Locke has a ready answer: The "injured party," he says, the
people. They do not have this power by the constitution, "yet
they have by a law antecedent and paramount to all positive
laws of men, reserved that ultimate determination which belongs to all mankind, where there lies no appeal on earth, viz.,
to judge whether they have just cause to make their appeal to
heaven." Does not this hypothesis lay "a ferment fot frequent
rebellion?" Perhaps, admits Locke, but no more than the exercise of despotic power which threatens the "lives, liberties, or
fortunes of the people." But the danger of revolt is not so great
as some imagine. "Revolutions do not happen upon every
little mismanagement of public affairs ... great mistakes ...
and all the slips of human fraility will be botne without mutiny
ot murmur ... peoples are averse to quit their old constitutions
... but if a long train of abuses, prevarications and artifices, all
tending the same way, make the design visible to the people ...
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it is not to be wondered that they should rouse themselves and
endeavor to put the rule in such hands which may secure to
them the ends for which government was at first erected ... "
It was such "a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing
invariably the same Object," that led to the revolt and loss of empire. No one of the measures complained of was of sufficient importance in its economic effects or in its political implications, to
cause the separation.H All taken together seemed, in the light of
the prevailing philosophy, to disclose a design, having "in direct
object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states."
In fact despotism was inherent in British colonial theory as set
forth in the Declaratory Act of 1766, and in the reports of the
Board of Trade already quoted. It required only the legislation of
1774 to disclose its "absolute" character. From this there seemed
"no appeal on earth," leaving the colonies free to decide "whether
they had just cause to appeal to heaven."
If we cannot agree with Alvord that England's loss of Empire
was due to her bungling western policy, or even with Professor
Lewis that it was "a main cause of the split" between England and
the colonies (The Indiana Company, 77), we can agree with what
seems to be Alvord's second thought on the subject expressed toward the end of his second volume: "If historians would interpret
rightly the causes of the American Revolution, they must not let
their vision be circumscribed by the sequence of events in the East.
Rather let their eyes seek a wider horizon that will bring within
their view the occurrences beyond the mountains, where the British
ministers experimented in imperialism and sought a basis for their
future colonial policy in the administration of the West."
One cannot go over the literature of this period of our history
without being intrigued by the old question: What were the real
motives of the men who led the colonies into the revolt? T,he problem with which we have been dealing jllustrates in some measure
the difficulty in finding the answer to that question. A ,re<;ent
writer in discussing the "Causes of the Revolution" has said, after
nearly tWO centuries of labor by t,he historians, that this ~uestion
remains "more than ever a major one." The main point,he$aYS.
·JC....1 Becker, The Beginnings of the American Peoflie,215·21'l.
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on which they are divided is the extent to which the motives of
the patriots were economic or were political and constitutional.
Is the distinction worth the labor spent upon it? Locke did not
make it. He spoke always of "life, liberty, and property" as
equally sacred. The patriots did not make it. The Virginia bill of
rights includes among the "inherent rights" of men "the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." Jefferson expressed the same idea in happier phrase in the Declaration,
and the Constitution throws a protecting shield about this trio of
rights with some pre-eminence given to property. It is only in our
time that it has become commonplace to set "human rights" off
against "property rights" by those who think it noble to defend the
one and ignoble, "selfish," to defend the other. It is a sign of the
time; of the revolution through which we are muddling our way.
Of course property has no "rights," but persons owning property
whether natural or corporate, have, and it is not unworthy to defend them.
It seems safe, however, to predict that the debate of the historians
will continue into the indefinite future. Those who believe that all
history is a history of class struggle, primarily for material ends,
will continue to regard the Revolution as a classic illustration of
their theory. Historians of another school, who believe that men
do not live by bread alone, will continue to stress the non-material
motives of the revolutionists. Fully aware of the material interests
involved in the controversy, they regard encroachments upon them
as occasions for inquiring into and defending their "rights" established in law, in the charters, or belonging to them as free men.
The great watchwords of the Revolution were not mere abstractions.
What the colonists wanted was "liberty" to do this or that; "freedom" from this or that. At some points the issue was economic, at
other points non-economic. What they wanted fundamentally was
"liberty" to enjoy the fruits of their industry: to convert their raw
materials into goods for use, to sell their exports in the best market,
to regulate their own currency, to move freely from one part of the
country to another. They wanted "freedom" from arbitrary authority-from arbitrary arrest, from being sent overseas for trial, from
being tried in admirality courts without a jury of their peers, from
having foreign troops quartered on them in time of peace; they
wanted freedom of speech in their legislatures without having them

A BELATED LECTURE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY

53

dissolved or suspended, freedom from taxation without their consent, freedom of trade, freedom from Parliamentary amendment
of their charters. In a word, they wanted that freedom of choice
which distinguishes free men from the unfree.
These matters are fairly representative of the general field of
controversy that led to separation. Who can tell whether or to what
extent they were economic or were political and constitutional.
Taking particular items, who can tell whether it was the economic
loss wrought by the trade laws, or the extraordinary measures found
necessary to enforce them, that brought the colonists to the fighting
point? Who can tell whether those who opposed the taxes did so
with hand on pocketbook, or with eyes on the law books from the
Magna Charta down? Supporters of the tax measures in Parliament
argued that the amount to be raised constituted no real grievance
(though large enough, it appears, to warrant risking the integrity
of Empire by pressing to secure it.) To these Burke replied: "If they
consider nothing in taxes but their weight as pecuniary impositions,
there might be some pretence for this denial; but men may be
sorely touched and deeply grieved in their privileges, as well as in
their purses. Men may lose little in property by the act which takes
away all their freedom." Who can tell whether or to what extent
loyal Virginians were turned into revolutionists because opportunity
was denied them to acquire great landed estates in the West; or,
because a few scattered Indian tribes, and a group of Pennsylvanian
and English speculators were given preferential treatment within
their own boundaries; or because of the ineptitude of the government in dealing with the western question, and indeed with many
other phases of colonial policy?
And this brings us back once more to our text. It will be recalled that Alvord attributes the mismanagement of the Mississippi
Valley to "the exigencies of British politics." Well, those exigencies
were what they were at the time because of the collapse of party
government. The country had long-perhaps too long-been ruled
by the Whig party, or the great Whig families, if you like. Whatever its faults, and there seems to have been many, it had permanence, continuity. On the accession of George III, all this was
changed. The party was broken into a number of factions, led by
this or that political personage, none of them nor the Tories strong
enough to form a ministry; and hence the necessity of carrying on
government by coalition ministries, difficult enough in time of
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war and more difficult in time of peace. The most potent of these
factions was known as the "King~s Friends," made up, Burke dechlred, of mediocrities who thought by attaching themselves to the
Court to gain "a degree of power which they could never hope
to derive from natural influence ,01' from honorable service"-a
"cabal of the closet and the back-stairs," he contemptously called it.
The King's great design was to restore to the Crown some of the
power and dignity lost under the Whigs. He would make the
ministry responsible to him as well as to Parliament. Burke sawin
the King's plans an influence that "strikes a palsy into every nerve
of our Constitution, making Ministers fearful of attempting and incapable of executing any useful plan of domestic arrangement, or
of foreign policy." (Thoughts on the Present Discontents, 1770).
And so it came about that during the critical period following the
peace of 1763, British policy was determined, according to Burke,
by u an Administration Constitutionally impotent, because supported by no party." Alvord has amply illustrated this impotence in his
study of British politics in the management of the region west of
the mountains, and has shown the factional influences responsible
for the policy adopted. Doubtless similar studies of other colonial
issues as they arose would disclose a similar relationship between
factionalism and ministerial mishaps in dealing with a large range
of colonial affairs.
What, it may be asked, could party government have done that
was not, or could not, have been done by a factional regime?
Burke's idea of party was that it is made up of a body of men bound
together by common political principles led by men who had gained
distinction and public confidence by public service. If such a party
had been in power led by men of statesman stature (in which the
country was not lacking) there would have been some comprehension of what could not be done in the colonies as well as reasonable assurance of what could be done. Such a government might
reasonably be expected (1) to recognize the dignity, worth, and
maturity of the "colonials," earned by their achievements in conquering the wilderness and in establishing stable civil governments; (2) to study the grounds of complaint aganist the laws of
trade before attempting to enforce them by extraordinary meafll!! of
doubtful legality. Such a study would have disclosed that the
regulations of a hundred years' growth, were 'heavily weighted in
favor of British interests with little or no regard for colonial welfare;
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that each new one tended, as Carl Becker has pointed out, to increase the burden imposed by every other;42 and it might have led,
as a matter of policy, to a recodification of the laws with due regard
to the interest of this outlying part of the Empire. So important
did Lecky regard the diversion of the colony trade from its natural
channels and Grenville's enforcement policy with its attendant incidents, he ventured the opinion that: "If the 'Wealth of Nations'
had been published a century earlier, and if its principles had
passed into legislation, it is quite possible that the separation of
England and her colonies might have been indefinitely adjourned."
(American Revolution. Woodburn, ed., p. 46) Such a government
as we have supposed might (3) have adopted Shelburne's plan for
raising an "American fund" by the sale of land and the rigorous
collection of quit rents on old and new grants, allowing the "course
of empire" to take its way legally as it did illegally, thus avoiding
the most disastrous of Grenville's policies-the imposition of taxes.
There was another feature of politics at the seat of Empire that
•• "Only when regarded as a whole was the policy of Grenville seen to spell
disaster. Each new law seemed carefully designed to increase the burdens imposed by every other. The Sugar Act, for example, taken by itself, was perhaps
the most grievous of all. The British sugar island, to which it virtually restricted the West Indian trade of the Northern colonies, offered no sufficient
market for their lumber and provisions, nor could they, like the Spanish island,
furnish the silver needed by continental merchants to settle London balances
on account of imported English commodities. Exports to the West Indies and
imports from England must, therefore, be reduced; the one event would cripple
essential colonial industries such as the fisheries and the distilling of rum,
while the other would force the colonists to devote themselves to these very
<fumes tic manufactures which it was the policy of the English Government t~
discourage. These disadvantages, which attached to the Sugar Act itself, were
accentuated by almost every other cardinal measure of Grenville's colonial
policy. With the chief source of colonial specie cut off, the Stamp Act increased
the demand for it by 60,000 pounds; when the need for paper money as a legal
tender was more than ever felt, its further use was shortly to be forbidden
altogether; when the diminished demand for labor, occasioned by restrictions
upon the West Indian trade, was likely to stimulate migration into the interior.
the West was closed to settlement. And the close of the French war, which had
raised the debt of the colonies to an unprecedented figure, was the moment
selected for restricting trade, remodeling the monetary system, and imposing
upon the colonies taxes for protection against a danger which no longer
threatened. Little wonder that to the colonial mind the measures of Grenville
carried all the force of an argument from design: any part, separated from the
whole, might signify nothing; the perfect correlation of the completed scheme
was evidence enough that somewhere a malignant purpose was at work bent
upon the destrnction of English liberties."-Beginnings of the American People,

215-217.
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must have strengthened the American resistance to any encroachment from that quarter upon their "rights." I refer to the political
corruption which characterized British politics during most of the
eighteenth century. It seems to have reached classic perfection during the long ministry of Sir Robert Walpole (1721-1742). The
evil lived after him in the Newcastle ministry. Under the new
monarch, the "King's Friends" set out to cure the evil: "Party was
to be totally done away, with all its evil works. Corruption was to
be cast down from Court." But in a few months, says Burke, they
"soused over head and ears into the deepest and dirtiest pits of
corruption." While the repeal of the Stamp Act was pending, Pitt
wrote Shelburne: "The evils are I fear, incurable. Faction shakes
and corruption saps the country to its foundation."
All this was known to the colonists; they were kept well informed by such opposition pamphlets as that of Burke and by their
agents in London. George Croghan, the Pennsylvania back-woodsman, was shocked by what he saw of it. Franklin, writing to his
son, quoted the going price of a seat in Parliament and gave an
estimate of the sterling value of the King's "corruption fund."
George III was ready enough to bow Lord Hillsborough out of the
ministry because by his western policy he had alienated the affection
of the colonists for Royal government. How much more must their
affection for him and for England have been alienated by his mishandling of colonial affairs due to the factionalism for which in
large measure he was responsible; and by the reasonable suspicion
that every decision made in London affecting the colonies was
tainted by the great national malady from which they were essentially free. For, as Lecky points out, in the colonies: "Political
corruption, the great cancer of English life, was almost unknown."
Such was the plight of England in the hour of triumph over an
ancient foe-England to whom the world is so much indebted for
her contribtuion to the principles and the administration of
government by free men. In that hour, with the collusion if not
under the compulsion of a wilful king, she had forsaken the path
by which her real greatness had been attained. Shelburne understood this. He notes that while four French Kings in the seventeenth century were raising their country "to the utmost pitch of
grandeur," the English people were engaged in resisting encroachments upon their rights and liberties by four kings of the "weak
and bigoted house of Stuart ... and by this means procured for us
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what was worth more than all the French conquests." (Life, 2: 358)
Burke understood it. He told he House of Commons that in decrying and impairing the liberties of the Colonies, they were endangering their own. "In effect," he said, "we suffer as much at
home by this loosening of all ties, and this concussion of all established opinions, as we do abroad; for in order to prove that the
Americans have no rights to their liberties, we are every day endeavoring to subvert the maxims which preserve the whole spirit
of our own. To prove that the Americans ought not to be free, we
are obliged to depreciate the value of liberty itself; and we never
seem to gain a paltry advantage over them in debate without attacking some of those principles or deriding some of those feelings, for
which our ancestors shed their blood."
One of those principles was resistence to arbitrary authority.
From the beginning of the constitutional struggle in the colonies
over taxation, a few powerful voices were raised in Parliament in
support of their position. As the purpose of the King's counterrevolution unfolded, it was found that the home country was itself
faced with a constitutional problem. The Wilkes affair, running
through the second half of the 1760's, furnished a home-made
illustration of Parliamentary usurpation which the Americans were
resisting. The case involved questions of freedom of the press, false
arrest and imprisonment, expulsion from Parliament and finally
of seating a member who had not been chosen by the electors.
Wilkes was himself an unsavory character, but he was regarded as
a victim of ministerial persecution and the reaction was so great in
Parliament and on the streets to the latest step in the affair, that,
at a nod from their master, the "King's Friends" deserted the
ministry and it fell-the fourth Whig Ministry in a row to be upset
by the King. Meanwhile the Tories had been gaining strength and
the King chose one of them, Lord North, to form a ministry. "His
compact body of 'King's Friends,'" says an English historian,
"aided by mercenary helpers from among the Whigs, preserved a
constant majority in Parliament" for twelve years (1770-1792). It
fell to him to retain the Tea Tax, to attempt to bribe the colonists
into paying it, to invite trouble by sending the East India Company tea to American ports, to see the coercive acts through Parliament, to conduct a long war against his judgment, to hear of the
surrender at Yorktown, to see his long-sustained majority melt way,
and to see his successor negotiate for England an inglorious peace.
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So ended what was begun, using Shelburne's words, as a "constitutional war" and became a war for Independence. For twenty
years ~ struggle had been going on between two unequal parts of
the Empire, to establish in practice what they regarded as their
respective "rights," confessedly ill-defined, under the English constitution, various charter grants, and under the great "charter of
nature.' We can best look upon the struggle as a series of "challenge"
and "responses," between the two parties to the conflict. Both parties
had to learn in the hard way that they had only such "rights" as
they found on experience they could exercise. There are many
things in the American conduct of the revolution we must wish
were otherwise-acts that were unlawful under any code, mob violence, destruction of other men's property, the treatment of the
loyalists. If, however, we center our attention upon the leaders of
the Revolution from the beginning to its consummation in the
establishment of the Republic, we cannot but admire and approve,
barring a few slips of sharp practice, their wisdoin, their integrity,
courage and persistence, the high level of their statesmanship; and
be everlastingly grateful to them (or the heritage they left us.

